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Abbreviations 
APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
CFR Code of Federal Regulations 
DOT Department of Transportation 
EMRS Emergency Management Response System   
FAD Foreign Animal Disease 
FADD Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician  
FADDL Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory  
FMD Foot and Mouth Disease 
FMDv  Foot and Mouth Disease virus  
FMCSA Federal Motor Carriers Safety Administration 
FSIS Food Safety Inspection Service 
NASS National Agricultural Statistics Service 
NAHEMS National Animal Health Emergency Management System 
OIE World Organization for Animal Health, Office International des Epizooties 
US United States of America 
USDA United States Department of Agriculture 
USDA FAD PReP 
United States Department of Agriculture Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness 
and Response Plan 
VS  Veterinary Services 
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Definitions 
Bio-Zip Liner  
Bio-containment bags which are constructed of a thermally-bonded layering of 
polypropylene and featuring an industrial zippering system, The Bio-Zip 
Sealable Liners fit securely inside industrial roll-off containers, trailers or truck 
racks from 10 to 40 cubic yards in total volume.  They are used to manage large 
volume biological and organic waste streams and the associated odor, leakage, 
disease and environmental contamination issues.  Disclaimer: The document is 
not endorsing the product of a specific vendor, but merely used the data on this 
product as an example. 
Carcass The body of an animal that has died or been killed, and is not being slaughtered 
for human or animal consumption.  
Collecting station 
An establishment where carcasses may be placed for temporary holding until 
loaded on trucks. 
Confirmed positive case (of FMD)  
An animal with clinical signs consistent with FMD and from which FMDv is 
isolated and identified in a USDA laboratory or other laboratory designated by the 
Secretary of Agriculture. 
Control Area Consists of an infected zone and a buffer zone. Initially, the entire State, 
Commonwealth, Tribal Nation, or territory may be declared a control area and 
subject to movement restrictions until appropriate surveillance and 
epidemiological evidence has been evaluated and the extent of the outbreak is 
known. 
Decomposition 
The process by which organic substances are broken down into simpler forms of 
matter 
Dump Truck A standard dump truck is equipped with an open-box bed, which is hinged at the 
rear and equipped with hydraulic pistons to lift the front, allowing the material in 
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the bed to be deposited on the ground behind the truck at the site of delivery.  The 
truck does not have a sealed tailgate.   
Fomites Inanimate objects that, when contaminated with a viable disease agent, can serve 
as a source of infection for a susceptible host. 
Grapple A hydro-mechanical device able to rotate on an axis with a clamshell or bucket 
attached at the end of the boom, which is intended for the collection of large 
items, in this case carcasses 
Hazardous Material 
A substance or material that the Secretary of Transportation has determined is 
capable of posing an unreasonable risk to health, safety, and property when 
transported in commerce, and has designated as hazardous under section 5103 of 
Federal hazardous materials transportation law (49 U.S.C. 5103). The term 
includes hazardous substances, hazardous wastes, marine pollutants, elevated 
temperature materials, materials designated as hazardous in the Hazardous 
Materials Table of 49 CFR 172.101), and materials that meet the defining criteria 
for hazard classes and divisions in part 173 of subchapter C of this chapter. 
Herd The population of animals at defined premises. 
Incubation period  
The known or assumed period between the introduction of a pathogen into a 
susceptible animal and the occurrence of the first clinical signs of the disease; the 
OIE standard for FMD is 14 days. 
ID50 Infectious Dose 50; amount of pathogen measured as number of colony forming 
units (CFU) for bacteria or number of virus particles required to infect 50% of 
exposed individuals.  
Index premises  
The first premises known to have a case of FMD during the outbreak under 
investigation.  The true index premises are the premises with the first actual case 
in an outbreak; it is often not definitively determined.   
Infected premises  
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Premises where a presumptive positive case or confirmed positive case exists 
based on laboratory results, compatible clinical signs, case definition, and 
international standards 
Leakage The body fluids that have the potential to leak from the intact carcass post-
mortem.  These include feces, urine, stomach/rumen contents, blood, saliva, and 
milk spillage  
Leachate Liquid that is produced by the decomposition of livestock carcasses and seeps 
from the carcasses. 
Leak-Proof Liner 
A temporary durable sheet lining (made of plastic, vinyl, etc.) placed in the 
container of the truck and used to protect the bed and sidewalls of the cargo space 
of truck trailers 
PFU Plaque-forming unit; used in virology studies to estimate the quantity of viral 
particles present in a sample based on the number of plaques formed per unit 
volume. 
Premises A location where livestock are raised, housed, or pass through during commerce.   
Rendering truck 
Tractor-trailer truck with detachable trailer box and a leak-proof tailgate 
specifically designed for rendering. Trailer specifications can vary in length from 
26 to 40 feet (most common are 28, 32 and 40 feet) with standard width of 8 feet 
and height of 12 feet.   
Roll-Off Truck 
Tractor-trailer truck with detachable box trailer which is able to be removed from 
the trailer component. They are characterized by a rectangular footprint, utilizing 
wheels to facilitate rolling the trailer in place. The open top container is designed 
to be transported by special roll-off trucks. As the roll-off truck raises its 
hydraulically operated bed, the roll-off container rolls off of the bed. A cable is 
used to slowly lower the container. These can operate on a winch system or a 
hook-lift system.     
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Saprophytic decomposition/putrefaction 
One of the stages of decomposition, produced mainly by the action of bacterial 
enzymes, mostly anaerobic organisms derived from the gastrointestinal tract, 
causing hemolysis, disintegration of tissue, and gas formation in blood vessels 
and tissue spaces.  
Stamping out 
Depopulation of clinically affected and all presumed exposed susceptible animals.  
Spillage Seeping of carcass fluids from the carcass to the truck and then to the 
environment.  
Tarp A sheet of material, such as waterproofed canvas, vinyl coated polyester mesh, 
etc. which is used to cover the open trailer to protect contents from visibility or 
ejection of material. 
TCID50 Tissue Culture Infective Dose 50; amount of a pathogen measured as number of 
virus particles required to  produce pathological change in 50% of cell cultures 
inoculated, expressed as TCID50/mL. 
Truck A vehicle or conveyance used for the transportation of carcasses. 
Stages of disease: 
Infected Includes all stages of disease (L+I+C):  latent (L), pre-clinically infected (I) and 
clinically infected (C).   
Viremic Active virus circulating in the bloodstream. Susceptible species can be viremic 
and shedding virus before they develop clinical signs.  Includes the pre-clinical (I) 
and clinical (C) stages of disease in this risk assessment.  
Incubation period 
Time from exposure to the development of clinical signs.  
Pre-clinically infected stage (I) 
Animal is viremic, is shedding virus, but does not have clinical signs. These 
animals represent the highest risk for spread of virus.    
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Clinically infected stage (C)  
Animal is viremic, shedding virus and is exhibiting clinical signs of disease.  
Latent (L) Susceptible animal that has been exposed and is incubating the virus, but is not 
viremic.   
Recovered (R)  
No longer infected with the virus.  
Susceptible (S)  
Healthy animal likely to be exposed to the virus.  
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Executive Summary 
The present risk assessment proactively evaluated the risk of infecting susceptible livestock by 
the movement of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) infected carcasses (swine and cattle) from 
FMD infected premises. The risk assessment evaluated the most up to date available science and 
solicited opinion from experts when data was lacking. This risk assessment is proactive in nature 
and the scenarios, pathways and depopulation practices assessed were based on the current 
practices and regulations applicable during an animal disease outbreak in the US. The 
characteristics, types of conveyance methods, and equipment used to transport the infected 
carcasses were provided from expert opinion and verified through site visits. Different modeling 
techniques were used to estimate the number of infected animals during a FMD outbreak at 
various time intervals, the total time estimated from infection to depopulation and the total 
amount of FMD virus (FMDv) contained in a disposal truck. The main outcomes of the risk 
assessment should be reviewed if needed as new data becomes available in the future. 
Risk estimation: The risk of FMD infection of susceptible livestock associated with the 
movement of swine and cattle carcasses from FMD infected premises to a disposal site during a 
FMD outbreak in the United States is negligible when using a standard rendering truck (tailgate 
sealed and tarp cover) and a Bio-Zip bag, and between negligible and low when using a 
standard rendering truck or a roll-off /dump truck with a Bio-Zip  bag. The risk level in other 
scenarios (uncovered standard rendering trucks, uncovered roll-off/dump trucks, covered roll-
off/dump trucks and a liner) is between moderate and high. 
Main results: Time for FMD detection was estimated by a disease spread model to be between 
4-10 days for swine and beef cattle and 3-9 days for dairy cattle premises of different sizes. Total 
time from infection to depopulation (including detection and confirmation) for the first FMD 
infected case was estimated to be between 10-15 days for swine, 8-12 days for dairy and 10-14 
days for beef cattle premises. Total time estimated for subsequent FMD cases was between 7-12 
days for swine, 6-9 for dairy and 8-11 days for beef cattle premises. Most of the animals (>65% 
for the first case and >81% for subsequent cases) were viremic at the time of depopulation. The 
average concentration of FMDv in a carcass in experimental inoculation studies was 103 Plaque-
Forming Unit per gram (PFU/g) for a pig carcass and 106 PFU/g for a cattle carcass. The total 
amount of infected carcasses moved to the disposal site (relative to the size of the animal carcass 
and the capacity of the truck trailer) was between 23-390 cattle carcasses and 117-780 pig 
carcasses per truck.  Any small amount of body fluids (1 mL) would contain virus that is equal 
and greatly exceeds the infective dose by oral and inhalation route for pigs and cattle. The 
likelihood that swine and cattle carcasses moved from FMD positive premises will contain an 
infective dose was high. The use of a Bio-Zip  bag in a standard rendering truck (tailgate sealed 
and tarp cover) reduces the likelihood of leakage, spillage and aerosolization to negligible.
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1. Background
This risk assessment was performed by the University of Minnesota’s Center for Animal Health 
and Food Safety to proactively evaluate the risk of moving swine and cattle carcasses to an 
offsite disposal location, from a Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) confirmed positive premises 
during a FMD outbreak in the United States (US), as it relates to potential spread to susceptible 
livestock.  
In the event of a FMD outbreak in the US, Local, State and Federal authorities will implement a 
foreign animal disease emergency response as described in the USDA Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (APHIS) Framework for Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response 
Plan (USDA FAD PReP).  This response includes a control and eradication strategy that will 
utilize depopulation, quarantine, vaccination, and movement control measures applied 
throughout the swine and cattle industry. If depopulation is utilized, due to the large amount of 
biomass from carcasses and potential limitations on the premises of origin for disposal, there 
may be a need to transport carcasses offsite for disposal.  This movement has the potential to 
result in virus spread to other uninfected premises and susceptible livestock.   
Risk assessment in the animal health context comprises a framework that uses a tool set and 
available scientific information to assess the situational level of risk to the health of an animal 
population and the potential consequences. Completing this type of risk assessment in a timely 
manner during an outbreak is typically impractical.  Risk assessment conducted proactively, 
before an outbreak occurs, provides the framework necessary for decision makers to identify the 
risk pathways for disease transmission. They are thus equipped to quickly assess the 
effectiveness of the current practices, preventive measures and additional mitigation measures, if 
needed, as they pertain to the risk associated with the movement of an agricultural commodity.
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2. Scope
The purpose of this risk assessment is to determine the risk of FMDv infection of susceptible 
livestock associated with the movement of swine and cattle carcasses from a FMD-infected 
premise to an off-site disposal facility during a FMD outbreak in the United States. The risk 
evaluation is based on the likelihood of FMDv being present in the carcasses at the time of 
transportation and the likelihood their movement could serve as a source of infection for 
susceptible livestock.  The risk assessment evaluates the likelihood that: 1) the swine and cattle 
carcasses from a FMD-infected premises will contain an infective FMDv dose after completion 
of euthanasia;  2) FMDv could be released into the environment from the carcasses through post-
mortem leakage of infected body fluids and/or aerosolization of infectious particles from the 
body fluids; and 3) susceptible livestock will be infected by FMDv during the transportation of 
carcasses from the infected premises to the disposal site.  
The primary mode of transportation evaluated for carcass movement from the FMD-infected 
premises of origin directly to a disposal site is a rendering truck.  This is defined as a tractor-
trailer truck equipped with a box trailer (lengths of 28 ft, 32 ft, or 40 ft) that has a sealed, leak-
proof tailgate and is open on the top. The second type of truck that will be considered in this risk 
assessment is the roll-off truck.  This truck has a removable open-top, box trailer that is fitted 
onto a rectangular footprint and utilizes wheels to facilitate rolling the trailer into place.  The 
third type of truck that will be considered is the dump truck.  A standard dump truck is equipped 
with an open-box bed, which is hinged at the rear and equipped with hydraulic pistons to lift the 
front, allowing the material in the bed to be deposited on the ground behind the truck at the site 
of delivery. The standard rendering truck, roll-off and dump truck will be considered with and 
without the following mitigations (one or in combination) that can be used in conjunction with 
the standard trailer:  
1) Tarp covering
2) Bio-Zip, leak-proof carcass bags
3) Leak-proof liner (only for roll-off and dump trucks)
For each of the transportation modes, the following release and exposure pathways were 
addressed: 
 Cross-contamination of trucks, personnel and equipment from carcass fluids
contaminated with FMDv escaping from the conveyance.
 Aerosol transmission of FMDv particles escaping from the conveyance.
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3. Assumptions
A conservative approach using the “worst-case” scenario was used in this risk assessment. 
Literature data on FMDv concentration in swine and cattle carcass tissues consider animals 
artificially inoculated with FMDv at high concentrations, which may not represent the reality of 
a naturally occurring outbreak.  
This risk assessment takes into consideration all applicable regulations, including preventive 
measures already in place, as well as additional preventive measures that could be implemented 
during an outbreak. This assessment is proactive in nature and cannot address the specific 
circumstances surrounding an outbreak in detail. Therefore, we are making some assumptions to 
establish context and applicability. These assumptions are:  
 A FMD outbreak in the United States in the commercial pig and/or cattle (beef or dairy)
population has occurred.
 A swine or cattle farm has been confirmed as a FMD-infected premises and a specific
euthanasia protocol has been established as the depopulation method.
 All animals in the infected premises will be euthanized and moved to disposal offsite as
intact carcasses.
 All disposal options have been predetermined so that the time to locate is not part of the
delay of the disposal.
 Time to complete indemnity was not included in the estimation of total time from
infection to depopulation due to the assumption that this is not a time limiting step.
 The movement considered will be from one infected premises directly to the disposal site,
without any subsequent stops along the route.
 The same trucks, personnel and/or equipment will not be shared among multiple infected
premises without complete cleaning and disinfection.
 Carcasses will be moved immediately after euthanasia, so environmental factors
(temperature, pH) will not have an effect on FMDv concentration in the carcass.
 Post-mortem autolysis will occur, and there will be some leakage of fluids from the intact
carcasses. As fresh carcasses will be moved immediately after euthanasia, there will be
little saprophytic decomposition/putrefaction.  We assume minimal rigor mortis at the
onset of loading due to the short time between euthanasia and carcass loading.
 The tarp (roll-off or drawn down) will be appropriately cleaned and disinfected prior to
each load and following each unloading or there will be a new tarp utilized for each trip.
 Options and mitigations evaluated were provided to the risk assessment team and were
evaluated for their impact on the risk pathways.  They were not evaluated for their
functionality.  We assume all mitigations considered (e.g. Bio-Zip  bag, liner, tarp,
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equipment, cleaning and disinfection procedures) will function appropriately and/or be 
performed according to their specifications. 
 The exterior surfaces of trucks and tires will be cleaned and disinfected prior to leaving
the infected premises, as well as at disposal area following drop off, and will follow
accepted procedures outlined in the USDA APHIS FAD Prep Guidance (USDA FAD
PReP)
 Wildlife population pathways will not be considered in this risk assessment.
 Roads taken by the disposal trucks will be shared with the open traffic.
 All vehicles will be in compliance with federal and applicable state Department of
Transportation (DOT) regulations and APHIS carcass transportation regulations,
including that all vehicles used in transportation of carcasses will be leak-proof.
 The driver of the carcass truck will not come into contact with any carcasses or infected
equipment while on the infected premises, the carcass loading area or the carcass
unloading areas at the disposal site.
4. Overview of data analysis approaches
Risk Assessment Overview 
This risk assessment is based on the OIE guidelines and methodology for import risk analysis 
with some modifications (OIE, 2004). The OIE model is comprised of hazard identification and 
three steps within a risk assessment: 1) entry assessment (release of virus to the environment 
through the carcasses); 2) exposure assessment (exposure of susceptible animals); and 3) risk 
evaluation (considers the entry and exposure assessments to provide the overall risk estimation). 
The emphasis of this risk assessment is the release of FMDv associated with the movement of 
swine and cattle carcasses from a FMD positive premises and exposure of susceptible livestock. 
If the entry assessment demonstrates a negligible likelihood of the carcass being contaminated 
with FMDv, the risk assessment may be concluded. However, if the risk is estimated to be 
greater than negligible, the next step in the risk assessment is the exposure assessment, which 
would assess the likelihood that susceptible animals will be infected by FMDv through the 
movement of carcasses from FMD positive premises.  
As recommended by the OIE, the risk analysis process is described as follows:     
 Hazard identification is the process of identifying and understanding the biology and
epidemiology of FMD and FMDv to determine whether the agent is a hazard under specified
situations.
 Entry assessment determines the likelihood of an agricultural commodity (e.g. carcass) being
infected or contaminated with a hazard (e.g. FMDv) and describes the biological pathways
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necessary for that hazard to be introduced into a particular environment with susceptible 
livestock. It includes an estimation of the likelihood (i.e. qualitative or quantitative) of each 
of the pathways.     
 Exposure assessment describes the biological pathway(s) necessary for exposure of animals
to the identified hazard (e.g. FMDv) and estimates the likelihood of those exposures
occurring.
 Risk estimation consists of integrating the results from the entry and exposure assessments to
produce summary measures of the risk associated with the identified hazard.
Likelihood and risk evaluation 
The likelihood for each pathway was assessed and categorized using the descriptive scale in 
Table 1 below:     
Table 1: Descriptive scale to estimate the likelihood for an event to occur 
Likelihood Descriptive Definition
High The event is very likely to occur 
Moderate The event is unlikely but does occur with a certain 
probability 
Low The event is unlikely to occur 
Negligible The likelihood that the event will occur is 
insignificant, not worth considering 
The risk estimation was based on the summarization of the likelihoods for each pathway in the 
entry and exposure assessments.  
Uncertainty estimation 
The uncertainty of the likelihood/risk estimation was assessed by using a range within the 
descriptive definitions in Table 1. When uncertainty about the estimation was low (the estimation 
was somewhat certain), only one descriptive definition was used to estimate the likelihood/risk 
(e.g., low, high). When the uncertainty on the estimation was moderate or high the descriptive 
definition used to estimate the likelihood/risk was within a range (e.g., between moderate and 
high), the range being broader as the uncertainty about the estimation was higher. 
Modeling Overview 
A within herd stochastic disease  spread model was applied to simulate the  transmission of 
FMDv within a group and estimate the number of pigs, dairy cattle and beef cattle in various 
disease states at each time period. The disease states include: susceptible (S), latent (L), pre-
clinically infectious (PI), clinically infectious (CI) and recovered (R) (Carpenter TE, 2004). 
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Estimates of animal level disease stage durations (latent, preclinical, clinical, and recovered) 
were obtained from recently developed parameters used in the NAADSM (North American 
Animal Disease Spread Model) (USDA, 2012).The main outputs of the model were time for 
detection at different farm size scenarios and to simulate the number of viremic (pre-clinically 
and clinically infectious) and recovered animals that would be moved to the disposal site. 
The model updates the number of animals in each disease state every 6 hours, which increases 
the accuracy of detection. The uncertainties in input variables, as well as the inherent variability 
associated with the course of infection in individual populations and the spread within the group, 
are considered in the model. Appendix A: Model Disease Spread presents the assumptions, 
definitions and background information used in the disease transmission model.  
The detection module of the disease spread model estimates the time to detect FMD infection in 
the group based on heightened active observational surveillance for clinical signs, one of the 
mitigation measures that may be applied in an outbreak at the herd level. The model “checks” or 
applies specific detection mechanisms at user specified time steps (e.g., every day or twice per 
day). FMDv infection may be detected in a time period based on the specific detection 
mechanism and the number of clinically infectious animals.  
Inputs for the disease spread model in the form of probability distributions for each disease state 
(latent, pre-clinical and clinical) for the transmission of FMDv within swine, dairy and beef 
cattle populations were obtained from an APHIS study where data from different FMD studies 
were analyzed by meta-analysis to estimate the probability distributions ((USDA 2012); (USDA, 
APHIS, NAHMS, 2012)). 
5. FMD Depopulation Procedures and Carcass Movement
5.1. Standard Operating Procedures for FMD Depopulation  
In infected premises that are being depopulated, the goals are to prevent contact between FMDv 
and susceptible animals, as well as to stop the production of FMDv in exposed or infected 
animals.  The response strategy of stamping out infected premises is being considered in this risk 
assessment.  This would be the case for an outbreak that is contained in jurisdictional areas in 
which FMD can be readily contained and further spread is unlikely.  Stamping out is the 
preferred depopulation method for clinically infected and in-contact susceptible animals as a 
means to reduce the potential of disease spread. For purposes of this risk assessment, we assume 
the depopulation procedures will follow the USDA FAD PreP Guidance (USDA FAD PReP). 
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The standard operating procedures during depopulation are that the driver arrives at the site with 
the vehicle and makes contact with the officials/on-site command at the infected site. Many 
rendering industries utilize rendering trucks that are equipped with their own carcass lift arms 
and clam buckets (grapple systems) (Figure 1).  These can be operated by the driver and 
although may need to leave the truck cabin to operate the lift, the driver will not step foot on the 
ground, nor have any contact with the carcasses. 
Figure 1: Standard Rendering Truck with Grapple System  
Image courtesy of Redwood Metal Works (http://redwoodmetalworks.com/) 
Figure 2:  Grapple truck with dump trailer. 
Image courtesy of Mid-Atlantic Waste Systems (http://www.mawaste.com/mobile.html) 
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In cases where a forklift or front-end loader is used to lift an entire dump container and empty its 
contents into the trailer, an on-site operator (not the truck driver) would operate that machinery.  
If applicable, the driver would then cover the trailer using the roller tarp, operated from the front 
of the trailer (Figure 2).  
During an outbreak, it is assumed that the driver never leaves the vehicle while on the infected 
premises (loading area). If duties cannot be performed by the driver from the cabin or platforms 
of the vehicle and would require the driver to be on the ground, personnel on the ground will 
load the vehicle and pull the tarp over the container. This tarp would be drawn tight in order to 
reduce air flow (although it still would not be 100% air-tight). In the US, it is required for trucks 
to be leak-proof while hauling animal carcasses (see 9 CFR 325.21 - Means of conveyance in 
which dead, dying, disabled, or diseased livestock and parts of carcasses thereof shall be 
transported (Code of Federal Regulations and Federal Register).  
For purposes of this risk assessment, the assumption is that euthanasia would take place only 
when there is a dedicated destination for the carcass disposal. This means that euthanasia will 
take place within a matter of minutes to hours prior to the carcasses being transported to the 
destination. The time limiting factor in a depopulation scheme is disposal rate, especially for 
large operations where burial on site is not an option.  Storage of carcasses creates another set of 
problems for landfills, rendering, and hauling (more liquids) unless chilled.  Therefore, 
simultaneous euthanasia and disposal will be the operational plan considered for this risk 
assessment. 
Estimates for depopulation rates and timing for depopulation procedures are not available in the 
literature. Expert opinion was thus solicited for euthanasia and depopulation times.  Experts in 
the field were contacted to provide their input on starting times for euthanasia for:  1) FMD 
Index premises, 2) subsequent FMD-infected premises, and 3) most likely depopulations rates 
for both swine and cattle (head/hour).  A range (minimum, most likely, and maximum) was 
requested for each of the times and rates.  See Appendix E: Expert Opinion – Depopulation for 
more information. These data are summarized in the table below. 
Table 2: Expert opinion on time to euthanasia and euthanasia time*
Expert Time to start depopulation 
(h)** 
Depopulation time (head/hour)*** 
1 Min: 24 
Most likely: 48-96 
Max: 72-168 
Min: 30 
Most likely: 50 
Max: 75 
2 Min: 12 
Most likely: 48 
Max: 72 
Min: 4*3 crews=12 (cattle)  
20*3 crews=60 (swine) 
Most likely: 8*3 crews=24 (cattle)  
160*3 crews=480 (swine) 
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Max: 300*3 crews=900 (swine) 
3 Min: 12 
Most likely: 24 
Max: 48 
Min: 6*3 crews=18 
Most likely: 12*3 crews=36 
Max: 20*3 crews=60 
4 Min: 24 
Most likely: 
Max: 48 
- 
5 Min: 36  
Max: 60 
Cash pistol-grip captive bolt: 30 
CO2 gassing roll-off trailers: 140 
Mobile electrocution trailer: 600 
Maximum rendering capacity: 167 
*: Assuming the outbreak is localized, and all the resources are available. 
**: Using the longest time when a range was provided. 
***: Using 3 eight men crews (20 h +4 h cleaning), 2 ten cow side discharge alleys and 2 
loaders 
Time to transport the depopulation equipment and to set-up for the depopulation is a likely range 
of 24 to 48 hours. The time required to move animals into position for depopulation should also 
be taken into consideration. Once equipment and animals are in position and the depopulation 
procedures are ready to begin, the next time-limiting factor is the speed of the depopulation 
technology chosen.  Table 3 below shows several of these technologies and their estimated 
speed.   
Table 3: Expert opinion on depopulation technology time efficiency
Depopulation Technology Time Efficiency 
On farm mobile electrocution trailer 
(construction in progress) 
Limit is estimated to be 600 feeder pigs/h  
(more time for sows and boars; not practical for iso-weans) 
On farm cash pistol-grip captive bolt Estimate is 30 head/h depending on the experience of the 
operator and their tolerance 
On farm CO2 gassing of swine in roll-off 
trailers or constructed chambers  
Dependent upon the size of the chamber or trailer, and size 
of animal, to determine batch size.  It usually will take 
about 15 minutes for the euthanasia process for each batch.  
Transport to slaughter plant but divert 
line to disposal rather than processing  
Estimate is the line speed of the plant whether using 
CO2/bolt or electric paddles* 
* This option is not likely applicable to the situation being evaluated in this assessment, unless
the premise is a slaughter facility.   
Assuming the outbreak is localized and all resources for depopulation are available, in larger 
premises and feeder premises the process to completely depopulate the premises may be slowed 
due to disposal and indemnity issues.  Depopulation efforts must be directly linked to the rate of 
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disposal.  The speed of euthanasia should not exceed the disposal rate. The disposal rate may be 
increased either through contracting multiple disposal options.     
5.2. Types of Transportation 
This risk assessment addresses mass depopulation at the infected premises site, with subsequent 
removal of carcasses from the infected premises using a standard rendering truck as conveyance.  
As defined for this risk assessment, the standard rendering truck is a tractor-trailer that is used to 
haul carcasses. This is a tractor-trailer truck (semi-truck) with an attached box trailer.  The box 
trailers are constructed of aluminum, smooth wall panels or stakes and sheets of aluminum or 
steel.  The trailers have a one-piece lift-off hinged doors or side swing tailgates, both of which 
are sealed and leak-proof, as required by federal law (9 CFR 325.21, Code of Federal 
Regulations and Federal Register). Standard trailers are 96 inches wide, with side heights of 5 ft 
or 6 ft smooth wall, double panel. The trailer lengths vary from 26 ft to 40 ft. and may be double- 
or triple axel. The most commonly used lengths in rendering industry practices are the 28, 32 and 
40 ft trailers, which can haul 40000, 45000, and 50000 lbs., respectively.  
Figure 3: Standard Rendering Truck and Trailer 
Image courtesy of Walinga (http://www.walinga.com/index.php?id=223) 
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Figure 4: Example of a tarp drawn tight over a trailer. 
Image courtesy of SolHuTech (http://www.solhutec.com/trucktarps.html) 
Another option to the open-top trailer of the standard rendering truck is a trailer that is equipped 
with tarps systems. Tarps can be built in sizes that can accommodate dump trucks, roll off 
containers, dumpsters, and open top containers. Tarp cover systems can be constructed from 
range of materials including mesh, PVC or vinyl. In addition, tarp systems can come in a variety 
of formats including a sliding cable system, flip tarp system, rolling system, and solid waste tarps 
(tie-down system).  Utilization of a tarp system is standard practice in states where law mandates 
that the top of the trailer be covered during carcass transportation to prevent leakage. Although 
the tarp reduces airflow, it is not airtight, and air will still flow over the carcasses.  The tarp also 
helps to control scavengers. Other options are to have the trailer built with manual, air or 
hydraulic cylinder control lids, which tend to be less common.   
For the purpose of lifting the carcasses into the trailer, trucks can be equipped with heavy duty 
hydraulic lift arms and buckets.  Many farms will have a ‘dump container’ that is used to hold 
routine mortalities until the render haul truck arrives. The dump container could be used in the 
case of small premises depopulation. A forklift or front-end loader can also be used to lift the 
entire container in order to dump the carcasses into the truck’s container.   
There are other secondary types of trucks that can be used to transport carcasses, such as a roll-
off truck. A roll-off truck is a tractor-trailer truck with detachable open-top box container, which 
is characterized by a rectangular footprint and wheels that facilitate rolling the container into 
position. As the roll-off truck raises its hydraulically operated bed, the container rolls off, and a 
cable is used to slowly lower it. These operate on a winch or hook-lift system. 
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Figure 5: Example of a roll-off truck trailer. 
Image courtesy of Redwood Metal Works (http://redwoodmetalworks.com/) 
The third type of truck trailer that will be considered in this risk assessment is the dump truck.  A 
standard dump truck is equipped with an open-box bed, which is hinged at the rear and equipped 
with hydraulic pistons to lift the front, allowing the material in the bed to be deposited on the 
ground behind the truck at the site of delivery.  By definition, this truck does not necessarily 
come equipped with a sealed tailgate. The roll-off and dump trucks will also be considered with 
and without a leak-proof liner, as some may not contain a sealed leak-proof tailgate.    
Figure 6: Example of a dump truck trailer. 
Image courtesy of Walinga (http://walinga.com/index.php?id=1741) 
Each of these types of trucks has certain advantages and disadvantages. The decision to utilize 
the standard rendering truck as the primary form of conveyance is based on industry standard 
practices and the availability of equipment in the event of a FMD outbreak with mass animal 
depopulation.  The standard rendering truck, roll-off and dump truck will be considered both 
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with and without the following mitigations that can be used in conjunction with the trailer: 1) 
Tarp covering, and 2) Bio-Zip, leak-proof carcass bags (Appendix B: Bio-Zip  Bags product 
information).  Bio-Zip  liners can be used to manage large volume biological waste streams, 
leakage and environmental contamination issues.  The bags are constructed of coated layers of 
polypropylene-based material fitted with an industrial grade zippered sealing system.  The Bio-
Zip  material is 100% solids and contains no hazardous air pollutants.  It has a zero rating for 
health, fire and reactivity and is zero class flammability.  The Bio-Zip  sealable liners fit 
securely inside industrial roll-off containers, trailers or truck racks from 10 to 40 cubic yards in 
total volume.  Bags are placed in the trailer and filled on premises with infected carcasses.  The 
entire bag is then removed from the trailer at the disposal site and disposed of. Bio-Zip  bags 
meet US regulations for land fillable materials. 
By determining the likelihood of leakage with the standard rendering truck and various 
mitigations, the assessment can be extrapolated to the other types of trucks with and without 
mitigations as well.   
5.3. Transportation Regulations 
Transportation of carcasses is well-regulated in federal, state and local jurisdictions.  Although it 
can be inferred from rules and known standards for carcass transport, there are no specific 
governing regulations for movement of high numbers of carcasses, such as in a disease outbreak 
situation.  For purposes of this risk assessment, the assumption is that all conveyance of 
carcasses during the depopulation procedure of a FMD infected premises will follow federal 
regulations for carcass movement (9 CFR 325.21, Code of Federal Regulations and Federal 
Register). This section states that “All vehicles and other means of conveyance used by persons 
subject to 9 CFR 325.20 for transporting in commerce or importing, any dead, dying, disabled, 
and diseased livestock or parts of carcasses of livestock that died otherwise than by slaughter 
shall be leak-proof and so constructed and equipped as to permit thorough cleaning and 
sanitizing.”  
Table 4: Federal Regulations Addressing Transportation of Carcass 
Federal Regulation Addresses 
9 CFR 325.21 Means of conveyance in which dead, dying, disabled, or diseased 
livestock and parts of carcasses thereof shall be transported. 
9 CFR 325.20  Transportation and other transactions concerning dead, dying, 
disabled, or diseased livestock, and parts of carcasses of livestock 
that died otherwise than by slaughter. 
Risk	Assessment	for	the	Transmission	of	Foot	and	Mouth	Disease	via	Movement	of	Swine	and	Cattle	
Carcasses	from	FMD‐infected	Premises	to	a	Disposal	Site	 Page	27	
For the case of a mass depopulation, we assume that the federal transportation regulations are 
followed as the minimum standard for all states. It is assumed that all rendering vehicles used in 
depopulation transportation efforts will be leak-proof.  Rendering vehicles are required to be 
leak-proof but not airtight.  States have additional regulations for carcass transportation that vary 
somewhat from state to state. Most states require that the carcass transportation trucks be 
licensed and permitted, and pass annual vehicle inspections.  Some states also have specific 
requirements as to the timing of cleaning and disinfection of vehicles. This risk assessment 
assumes the state of origin of carcasses and state of disposal site carcass transportation and 
disposal statutes will be followed (Appendix C: Federal and State Regulations for Carcass 
Movement).  
5.4. Pathway analysis for Carcass Movement 
Figures 7 and 8 show the series of events and pathways by which susceptible species may be 
infected via the movement of FMD infected carcasses from an infected farm. Two main release 
and exposure pathways are assessed in the current risk assessment: 1) leakage of contaminated 
body fluids from the rendering truck and cross-contamination with other trucks, personnel or 
equipment that will be in contact with susceptible livestock in other uninfected farms (Figure 7 
and Figure 8 A); 2) aerosolization of FMDv particles from the carcasses during movement and 
subsequent air transportation of those particles to uninfected farms with susceptible species 
(Figure 7 and Figure 8 B). 
Figure 7: Series of events to expose susceptible species to FMDv through the movement of 
infected carcasses. 
Infected 
farm
Infected 
animals
Viremic
Virus 
concentration 
in carcass
Movement 
to the 
diposal site
Leakage Cross‐contamination
Aerosolization Air transportation
Recovered
Non‐
infected 
animals
Risk	Assessment	for	the	Transmission	of	Foot	and	Mouth	Disease	via	Movement	of	Swine	and	Cattle	
Carcasses	from	FMD‐infected	Premises	to	a	Disposal	Site	 Page	28	
8A 
8B 
Figure 8: Aerosol (A) and cross-contamination (B) pathways for the exposure of susceptible 
species to FMDv through the transportation of infected carcasses.
6. Hazard identification
6.1. Background  
Foot and mouth disease (FMD) is a highly contagious viral disease affecting primarily cloven-
hoofed animals. The disease is characterized by the development of vesicles in and around the 
mouth and on the feet. Although natural FMD infection rarely causes the death of mature 
animals, the disease results in decreases in livestock productivity and causes serious economic 
impact on international trade of animals and animal products (OIE Technical Disease Cards)  
FMD was last reported in the U.S. in 1929 and in North America in 1952 (Canada) and 1954 
(Mexico). As of May 2012, of the OIE’s 178 Member Countries, 102 do not have FMD-free 
status, 66 are recognized as officially free (65 without vaccination and one with vaccination), and 
ten have officially free zones (6 without vaccination and 4 having zones with or without 
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vaccination). Out of the 102 countries without FMD-free status, 6 had an official status that is 
currently suspended (current FMD status can be found at www.oie.int.gov). There is substantial 
concern about incursions of this disease into the U.S., because of the unexpected occurrence of 
FMD outbreaks in previously FMD-free countries, including Taiwan (1997, 2000); Japan (2010, 
2000); South Korea (2010, 2000, 2002); North Korea (2007); South Africa (2000, 2006, 2007); 
Argentina (2001, 2006); Russia (2006, 2007) and Europe (2001). The potential risks and impacts 
that FMD may pose were demonstrated by the severe economic and livestock losses experienced 
in the United Kingdom in 2001. The historical consequences of these FMD outbreaks has 
reinforced the need for FMD awareness and evaluation of the possible pathways by which FMDv 
can spread and infect livestock and contaminate food sources, and how these can serve as a 
further route for spread of the virus (USDA FAD PReP, 2013).  
6.2. Virus Characteristics 
There are seven FMDv serotypes: A, O, C, SAT 1, SAT 2, SAT 3 and Asia 1. Each serotype can 
be divided further into subtypes. Serotypes A, O, C, SAT1, SAT2, SAT3, and Asia1 contain 32, 
11, 5, 3, 6, 3, and 4 subtypes, respectively. All serotypes produce disease that is clinically 
indistinguishable, but immunologically distinct. No cross-immunity is conferred between 
serotypes. Serotype O is the most prevalent and occurs in many parts of the world. Within each 
serotype is a spectrum of antigenic variation, resulting in strains having close or distant 
relationships to each other. Serotype A has the greatest antigenic variation ((Kitching RP, 1989); 
(Kitching RP, 1998); (Alexandersen S, 2005)). 
6.3. Host range of FMD 
Cloven-hoofed animals (ungulates) are the natural domestic and wild hosts of FMDv. They are 
susceptible to all 7 serotypes and many of the subtypes of FMDv. The severity of illness may 
differ depending on the specific serotype and the species that is affected. Susceptible species 
include cattle, pigs, sheep, goats, water buffalo, impala, bison, African buffalo, American Bison 
antelope, reindeer, moose, elk (although low), hedgehogs, porcupines, giraffes, elephants and 
Bactrian camels. Horses are resistant to FMD infection. New World camelids (llamas, alpacas, 
vicunas and guanacos) have low susceptibility to FMD infection. FMDv may also be transmitted 
to mice, rats, guinea-pigs, rabbits, hamsters, embryonating chicken eggs, chickens and various 
wild species, including European hedgehogs, chinchillas, muskrats, armadillos and peccaries. 
However, these latter species are not generally capable of spreading FMD (Alexandersen S, 
2005). 
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Humans can become infected with FMD through (1) handling of diseased livestock with virus 
entry through skin wounds and mucous membranes, (2) exposure through laboratory situations, 
or (3) by drinking infected milk. The virus is not readily transmissible to humans and thus should 
not be considered a zoonotic disease. (OIE, 2008) Cases of human disease are rare and have 
resulted in temporary and mild signs of disease (fever, vesicles on the hands, feet or in the 
mouth) (Alexandersen S, 2005). In contrast, Hand, Foot, and Mouth disease (HFMD) in humans 
is an unrelated viral disease that primarily affects infants and children. The human disease is 
often confused with FMD of livestock.  
6.4. Transmission 
FMDv is highly contagious, and can be transmitted by a variety of mechanisms.  When infected 
and susceptible animals are in close proximity, the airborne transfer of droplets is the most 
common mode of transmission. Other common mechanisms by which FMDv is spread are 
summarized below ((Alexandersen S, 2003b); (Alexandersen S, 2005)). 
 Direct contact with infected animals and movement of animals between premises.
 Contact with secretions from shedding animals─ exposure to secretions or mechanical
transfer between groups by fomites (hands, footwear, clothing, vehicles, and equipment)
and subsequent virus entry through cuts or abrasions in the skin or mucosa.
 Ingestion of FMDv contaminated animal products (meat) by pigs through swill feeding.
 Spread by wind, an uncommon event that requires the simultaneous occurrence of
particular epidemiological and climatic conditions.
6.5. Incubation Period 
The incubation period of an infectious disease is the time interval between exposure to an 
infective dose and development of clinical signs. The incubation period for FMD is known to be 
variable and dependent on the strain and dose of the virus, the route of transmission, the 
husbandry situation, and the species (Alexandersen S, 2003a). It is well known that FMD 
infected animals can shed virus during the incubation period, before the first detectable clinical 
signs are noted ((Orsel K, 2009); (Alexandersen S, 2001)). The peak of viremia can occur just 
before the animal breaks with clinical signs.   
For control purposes, the OIE uses 14 days as the incubation period of FMD ((OIE, 2008); 
(Alexandersen S, 2003b)) summarized the variability observed in the incubation period of the 
disease, which is presented below:  
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 There is a strong inverse relationship between the dose of virus and the length of the
incubation period, i.e., the higher the dose, the shorter the incubation period.
 The incubation period is usually 2-14 days, but can be as short as 24 hours.
 The latent period (animal exposed, infected and shedding the virus) is 1-2 days (Eble P,
2006). 
6.6. Clinical Signs 
Primary replication of FMDv takes place in the nasal and pharyngeal mucosa. Spread from these 
primary sites occurs to lymph nodes and the bloodstream, and resultant viremia distributes the 
virus to all organs and tissues. Viremia can commence a few hours after infection, and usually 
within 36 hours post-infection. Further replication of virus occurs in permissive cells and 
particularly at sites where characteristic lesions of FMD develop (Alexandersen S, 2001). The 
appearance of vesicles usually coincides with the peak of viremia and the highest concentration 
of virus is in tissues where the vesicles develop.  
FMD in pigs is clinically indistinguishable from other viral vesicular diseases of swine (swine 
vesicular disease, vesicular stomatitis, vesicular exanthema) (Alexandersen S, 2001).  It is 
usually severe and is characterized by lameness, reduced feed intake, lowered production, and 
the development of vesicles in and around the mouth and feet. Affected pigs become lethargic, 
remain huddled together and develop vesicles on the coronary band and heel of the feet, snout, 
lower jaw and tongue (Kitching RP, 2002). Body temperatures in pigs usually range from 39°C 
to 40°C, but can reach 42°C. The morbidity rate varies by the species affected, virus serotype 
and/or strain, and other factors. In regions where FMD is not endemic, the morbidity rate can be 
as high as 100 percent. The mortality rate is generally very low in adult animals, but may be high 
in young animals due to acute myocarditis (Alexandersen S, 2003b). 
6.7. Concentration of virus in tissues, secretions, excretions 
FMDv is present in multiple tissues, secretions and excretions of infected animals during pre-
clinical, clinical, and post-clinical stages. Urine and feces contain virus but in low 
concentrations. Fresh feces collected from the floor have been found to contain small 
concentrations of the virus up to 10 days post infection in pigs (Parker J, 1971).  The amount of 
aerosolized virus from infected animals can vary considerably. In contrast to other animals 
affected by FMD, infected pigs are recognized as the largest producers of aerosolized virus, 
excreting virus concentrations in the range of 105.6 to 108.6 TCID50 per pig/day (Alexandersen S, 
2005).  Although pigs are large aerosol producers, they are very resistant to infection by this 
route.  If a large group of pigs becomes infected with an appropriate viral serotype, the group can 
Risk	Assessment	for	the	Transmission	of	Foot	and	Mouth	Disease	via	Movement	of	Swine	and	Cattle	
Carcasses	from	FMD‐infected	Premises	to	a	Disposal	Site	 Page	32	
excrete large volumes of aerosolized virus, which can be transported to farms downwind and 
constitute a risk to sheep and cattle. Ruminants excrete less virus in their breath (104 to 105 
TCID50/day) compared to pigs, but are highly susceptible to infection via the inhalation route 
(Alexandersen S, 2005) 
In comparison with other livestock species, cattle are the largest overall producers of FMDv 
from all secretions/body fluids combined and are probably the main source for environmental 
contamination. They produce large volumes of FMDv in the epithelium of the tongue, which 
often sloughs off during clinical disease, as well as in saliva, urine, feces and milk, in 
comparison to other species. Cattle are extremely susceptible to infection by aerosol exposure to 
virus due to their large respiratory volume and may become infected at concentrations of FMDv 
as low as 0.06 TCID50 per cubic meter of air (Donaldson AI, 2001). Survival time of FMDv post-
mortem depends on the stage of disease at the time of slaughter, the organs affected, and the 
strain of virus. 
6.8. Environmental Persistence  
FMDv retains infectivity for considerable periods of time in the environment, provided it is 
protected from desiccation, heat and adverse pH conditions. For example, the virus may survive 
for 14 days in dry fecal material; six months in slurry in winter; 39 days in urine; 28 days on the 
surface of soil in autumn; and three days on the surface of soil in summer. Such observations 
have generally been made in countries with a temperate climate, and these survival times can be 
expected to be much the same in hotter climates (Geering WA, 2002).  FMDv is sensitive to 
desiccation. Relative humidity and temperature are the primary factors that affect survival of the 
virus in the environment. The virus survives best when the relative humidity exceeds 70%, and 
has poor survival when the relative humidity is below 50-60 (Sellers R, 1971). Sunlight and 
ultraviolet radiation have little effect on virus persistence (Donaldson AI, 1975).  
7. Entry Assessment
The entry assessment comprises the risk associated with the release of FMDv during the 
movement of swine and cattle carcasses from FMD positive premises to the disposal site. The 
release could occur by cross-contamination via contaminated body fluids escaping from the 
disposal vehicle or by transmission of FMDv by aerosolization. Each of these events was 
characterized by a pathway and, for each of the pathways, the likelihood of occurrence was 
evaluated based on available scientific information, logical assumptions and input from experts. 
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The pathways considered in the entry assessment that would result in the release of FMDv 
through swine and cattle carcasses movement were the following: 
 Likelihood that carcasses moved from FMD positive premises will contain an infective
dose. In this pathway, a disease spread model for FMD in swine, dairy and beef cattle and
expert opinion were used to estimate the total time from infection to depopulation, the
number of viremic and recovered animals, and the FMDv concentration in carcasses to be
moved after depopulation.
 Likelihood that transportation of carcasses will produce leakage and spillage of fluids
contaminated with FMDv. In this pathway, body fluid capacity of swine, dairy and beef
cattle was estimated. Characteristics of the disposal trucks were analyzed for the potential
for leakage of body fluids.
 Likelihood that transportation of carcasses will produce aerosolization of FMDv. In this
pathway, the potential for aerosolization of FMDv particles during movement of
carcasses was evaluated by using expert opinion.
7.1. Likelihood that swine and cattle carcasses moved from a FMD positive 
premise will contain an infective dose 
Summary: Time for FMD detection was estimated by a disease spread model to be between 4-
10 days for swine and beef cattle and 3-9 days for dairy cattle premises at different sizes. Total 
time from infection to depopulation (including detection and confirmation) for the first FMD 
infected case was estimated to be between 10-15 days for swine, 8-12 days for dairy and 10-14 
days for beef cattle premises. Total time estimated for subsequent FMD cases was between 7-12 
days for swine, 6-9 for dairy and 8-11 days for beef cattle premises. Most of the animals (>65% 
for the first case and >81% for subsequent cases) will be viremic at the time of depopulation. The 
average concentration of FMDv in a carcass in experimental inoculation studies was 103 PFU/g 
for a pig carcass and 106 PFU/g for a cattle carcass. The total amount of infected carcasses 
moved to the disposal site was between 23-390 cattle carcasses and 117-780 pig carcasses per 
truck.  This range was based on the weight of the animal carcass as well as the capacity of the 
truck trailer, taking into account the number of carcasses that could fit in the trailer. Any small 
amount of body fluids from the carcasses would contain virus that greatly exceeds the infective 
dose. 1 mL of body fluids could contain same amount and 10-100,000 times higher virus 
quantity (103-106 PFU) than the minimum infectious dose by oral (1.4x104-1.4x106 PFU) and 
inhalation route (7-357 PFU) for pigs and cattle. Likelihood estimation: The likelihood that 
the disposal truck with swine and cattle carcasses moved from FMD positive premises will 
contain an infective dose is high. 
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7.1.1. Time for FMD detection 
The time for FMD detection was estimated by a stochastic disease spread model. The parameters 
used in the model for the simulation of disease spread within a group are presented in Table 5: 
Input parameters used in the FMD spread model in a swine farm.. Estimates of animal level 
disease stage duration (latent, pre-clinical, clinical and recovery) were obtained from a recent 
study completed by USDA-APHIS-CEAH (USDA, 2012) by evaluating animal level data from 
published studies involving experimental infection with FMDv. The farm sizes selection was 
based on a compilation of statistics published by the National Agricultural Statistics Service 
(NASS) of the USDA for 2007-2012.  
The surveillance component used in the model was based on observation of clinical signs and, 
using a conservative approach, was set at one time per day. The threshold for considering 
detection of the disease was set at 5% of the herd showing clinical signs. These values were 
based on expert opinion of subject matter experts regarding the average percentage of naturally 
occurring lameness on swine and cattle farms in the period of 2007 and 2009 ((USDA 2007); 
(USDA 2009)). The following components of the NAHMS survey were considered: the 
percentage of pig deaths from lameness (i.e. 5.4% for all group sizes); unusually high number of 
pigs unwilling to eat or stand up (i.e. 7.3% for all group sizes); and lame pigs with reddened 
areas above the hooves (i.e. 2.4% for all group sizes). Naturally occurring lameness is hard to 
predict, since it will be different from one producer to another, depending on the farm 
characteristics. Endemic lameness could mask the clinical signs of a FMD outbreak and has been 
reported to be less than 5% for cases of mild lameness and less than 0.5% for severe lameness 
(Dr. Peter Davies, personal communication).  
Table 5: Input parameters used in the FMD spread model in a swine farm. 
Variable a Input Distribution/Value
Latent Period Gamma (α=1.896, θ=0.869)  
Pre-clinical Period Gamma (α=1.770, θ=0.690) 
Clinical Period Gaussian (μ=4.330, σ=1.944) 
Group Size 500, 1000, 5,000 and 10,000 head 
Adequate Contact Rate 6.14 (3.75, 10.06)b 
Detection Threshold  5% of group 
a: Distributions refer to swine groups of more than 200 head 
b: Contact rate value from Eble et al., (Eble P 2006) 
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Table 6: Input parameters used in the FMD spread model in a dairy and beef cattle herd.
Variable Input Distribution/Value
Latent Period Exponential 0.709 (mean of 33.72 h, SD of 34.17 h) 
Pre-clinical Period Lognormal (μ=0.862, σ=0.774) 
Clinical Period Gamma (α=4.752, θ= 0.736)  
Farm Size 100, 500, 1,000 and 2,000 head (dairy) 
5,000, 15,000, 30,000 and 50,000 head (beef) 
Adequate Contact Rate 52 to 216 contacts/day 
Detection Method 5% of herd 
The assumptions applied to the model included the following:  
 The spread model does not include the aerosol route of infection or cross-contamination
within groups (personnel and equipment), only direct contact between animals.
 The disease spread model assumes direct contact between all the animals in a herd, which
may overestimate the number of infectious animals in large feedlots.
 The on-farm surveillance is based on daily visual observation for clinically suspicious
animals. Clinically suspicious animals include animals with signs from any disease that is
similar to FMD.
 Inputs for the analysis are based on published literature and the best current knowledge of the
disease biology.
Appendix A: Model Disease Spread, contains the detailed information on the inputs and analysis 
of the model.  
Percentages of farm sizes (100-50,000 head) for swine, dairy and beef cattle premises based on 
USDA NASS data for 2007-2012 was used to predict the most likely farm size where the 
occurrence of an FMD outbreak could  happen. For example, for the swine industry the 
percentages of different farm sizes were as follows: 1-99 head (71.3%), 100-499 head (7.3%), 
500-999 head (3.4%), 1,000-1,999 head (4.8%), 2,000-4,999 head (8.3%), and ≥5,000 head 
(4.8%). These data were included in a discrete distribution function to characterize the 
distribution of the swine farm sizes in the US by using @Risk software (Palisade Corp., Ithaca, 
NY, US) by the following distribution: 
RiskDiscrete({100,500,1000,2000,5000,10000},{0.713,0.073,0.034,0.048,0.083,0.048}) Eq. 1 
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In any given outbreak situation, there is a 95% chance that the outbreak occurs in a pig farm with 
5,000 head or less, in a dairy farm with 500 head or less, and in a feedlot beef farm with 1,000 
head or less. Time for disease detection will depend on the farm size and clinical observation and 
was estimated to be between 4-10 days for swine and 3-9 days for dairy and beef cattle premises.  
7.1.2. Time from detection to depopulation 
Time from detection to depopulation was estimated by adding the time for detection and the time 
for starting the depopulation with the following equation: 
Total	time ൌ tୢୣ୲	 ൅	 tୡ୭୬୤ ൅ tୱୢୣ୮ Eq. 2 
where tdet is the time for FMD detection depending on the farm size, tconf is the time to the 
official laboratory confirmation of the disease and tsdep is the time to start the depopulation 
procedure.  
Time values for disease confirmation, starting the depopulation and depopulation rates were 
obtained from experts from Texas A&M Transportation Institute, West Texas A&M, Department 
of Homeland Security and APHIS. Time values were characterized by a Pert distribution, and 
@Risk software was used to estimate the total time by using Monte Carlo simulation with 10,000 
iterations. Input values for swine, dairy cattle and beef cattle premises are shown in Tables 9, 10 
and 11, respectively. Total time from infection to depopulation for the first FMD infected case 
was estimated to be between 10-15 days for swine, 8-12 days for dairy and 10-14 days for beef 
cattle premises. Total time estimated for subsequent FMD cases was between 7-12 days for 
swine, 6-9 for dairy and 8-11 days for beef cattle premises (Table 7).  
Table 7: Total time from infection to starting the depopulation procedure
Type of farm Total time (days)* 
First index case Subsequent cases 
Swine 11.7 (9.6-15.2) 8.7 (6.9-12.0) 
Dairy cattle 9.4 (7.5-11.6) 7.4 (5.7-9.4) 
Feedlot cattle 12.6 (10.5-14.4) 9.6 (7.8-11.1) 
*: After 10,000 iterations (mean, 5th, and 95th percentile values) 
Depopulation times were estimated by the following equation: 
Time	for	depopulation ൌ Dୖ ൈ farm	size Eq. 3 
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where DR is the depopulation rate in heads/h and farm size is the amount of heads in a farm. 
Table 8: Time to depopulate a farm for each of the species
Type of farm Depopulation time (h)* 
Swine 7.59 (0.27-43.12) 
Dairy cattle 4.33 (0.66-19.67) 
Feedlot cattle  35.85 (19.90-43.93) 
*: After 10,000 iterations (mean, 5th, and 95th percentile values) 
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Table 9: Input values to estimate timings for depopulation procedure in case of FMD outbreak in a dairy cattle farm.
Herd size Time to detect disease 
post infection (5th, mean, 
95th) (h)* 
Time from disease detection 
to lab confirmation (min., 
most likely, max. values) (h) 
Time from confirmation to 
starting depopulation (min., 
most likely, max. values) (h) 
Depopulation rate (min., most 
likely, max. values) (heads/h)** 
0-100 Pert (72, 115, 192) 
Pert (24, 48, 72) Pert (24, 48, 72) Pert (18, 36, 60) 
100-500 Pert (96, 125, 192) 
500-1,000 Pert (96, 130, 192) 
1,000-2,000 Pert (96, 137, 216) 
*: 5% detection level. **: Using three crews (8 men each) during 3 working shifts (20 h + 4 h cleaning) and two cow side discharge alleys (10 cows each) with two 
loaders. 
Table 10: Input values to estimate timings for depopulation procedure in case of FMD outbreak in a swine farm
Herd size Time to detect disease 
post infection (5th, mean, 
95th) (h)* 
Time from disease detection to 
lab confirmation (min., most 
likely, max. values) (h) 
Time from confirmation to 
starting depopulation (min., 
most likely, max. values) (h) 
Depopulation rate (min., most 
likely, max. values) (heads/h)** 
0-500 Pert (96, 144, 192) 
Pert (24, 48, 72) Pert (24, 48, 72) Pert (30, 140, 600) 
500-2,000 Pert (120, 168, 216) 
2,000-5,000 Pert (144, 168, 240) 
5,000-10,000 Pert (144, 190, 240) 
*: 5% detection level. **: Using three crews (8 men each) during 3 working shifts (20 h + 4 h cleaning) and two side discharge alleys with two loaders. 
Table 11: Input values to estimate timings for depopulation procedure in case of FMD outbreak in a feedlot beef cattle farm 
Herd size Time to detect disease 
post infection (5th, mean, 
95th) (h)* 
Time from disease detection to 
lab confirmation (min., most 
likely, max. values) (h) 
Time from confirmation to 
starting depopulation (min., most 
likely, max. values) (h) 
Depopulation rate (min., most 
likely, max. values) 
(heads/h)** 
0-5,000 Pert (96, 142, 216) 
Pert (24, 48, 72) Pert (24, 48, 72) Pert (18, 36, 60) 
5,000-15,000 Pert (120, 151, 216) 
15,000-30,000 Pert (120, 154, 216) 
30,000-50,000 Pert (120, 159, 240)  
*: 5% detection level. **: Using three crews (8 men each) during 3 working shifts (20 h + 4 h cleaning) and two cow side discharge alleys (10 cows each) with two 
loaders.
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7.1.3. Number of viremic livestock after depopulation 
The stochastic disease spread model was used to estimate the number of viremic (pre-clinical and 
clinical) and recovered animals at the time of depopulation for specific farm sizes (3,000 head 
for swine, 2,000 head for dairy and 5,000 head for feedlot cattle). Two different scenarios were 
evaluated: 1) First FMD case (Table 12); 2) Subsequent FMD cases (Table 13). The subsequent 
cases scenario was set at the minimum values obtained from experts for laboratory confirmation 
of the disease (24 h) and starting the depopulation procedure (24 h), due to the higher awareness 
of the disease. As shown in the table, most of the animals will be viremic (containing active 
FMDv) at the time of depopulation. 
Table 12: Results from the simulation for the first FMD case
Type of farm Time elapsed before 
depopulation (days)* 
Percentage of viremic animals 
(pre-clinical + clinical) (%) 
Percentage of 
recovered animals (%) 
Swine      
(3,000 head) 
11.2 (9.3-14) 82 (72-88) 16 (7-27) 
Dairy cattle 
(2,000 head) 
9.7 (7.7-12.8) 78 (65-88) 21 (9-34) 
Feedlot cattle 
(5,000 head) 
9.9 (8-12.9) 78 (65-88) 21 (9-34) 
*: After 10,000 iterations (5th and 95th percentile values). Times are adjusted for each of the farm sizes. 
Table 13: Results from the simulation for the subsequent FMD cases 
Type of farm Time elapsed before 
depopulation (days)* 
Percentage of viremic animals 
(pre-clinical + clinical) (%) 
Percentage of 
recovered animals (%) 
Swine      
(3,000 head) 
9.2 (8-12) 85 (81-89) 3 (2-5) 
Dairy cattle 
(2,000 head) 
7.7 (6-11) 91 (90-92) 3 (1-5) 
Feedlot cattle 
(5,000 head) 
7.9 (6-11) 91 (90-92) 3 (1-5) 
*: After 10,000 iterations (5th and 95th percentile values). Times are adjusted for each of the farm sizes. 
The time from detection to laboratory confirmation and from confirmation to starting the depopulation 
procedure was set at a total time of 48 h. 
Figures 9, 10 and 11 show the disease spread curve within a swine, dairy and beef cattle 
population for the first index case. As shown in the figures below at the time of depopulation 
there will be 2,300 viremic pigs, 1,400 viremic dairy cows and 3,500 viremic beef cattle.  
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Figure 9: FMD curve in a 3,000 head swine farm during the first index case 
Figure 10: FMD curve in a 2,000 head dairy cattle farm during the first index case 
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Figure 11: FMD curve in a 5,000 head feedlot beef cattle farm during the first index case 
7.1.4. FMDv concentration in swine and cattle viremic carcasses 
The concentration of FMDv observed in fresh tissues of pig skeletal muscle, fat, blood, lymph 
nodes and bone marrow in literature studies was from 6.31 PFU/g to 109.6 ID50/g for pigs (Table 
14). It is worth noting the majority of reports were based on the ‘worst-case scenario’, where 
pigs were inoculated with high virus titers (Mebus C, 1997).  The studies suggest that the greater 
quantities of virus were detected in pig blood, bone marrow or lymph nodes ((Alexandersen S, 
2001); (Sellers R, 1971); (Chou CC, 2004); (Mebus CA ,1993); (Savi P, 1962)). The lowest 
quantities of virus were found in fat and muscle ((Mebus CA 1993); (Chou CC, 2004)).  Given 
the high viral titers found in the various tissues, it is highly likely that FMDv would be present in 
the pig carcass tissues.  
Table 14: Titers of FMDv present in select tissues, excretions and secretions of pigs after 
slaughter 
Source of tissue, 
secretion, or 
excretion 
Initial virus inoculation Virus concentration at 
slaughter 
Reference 
Skin 107 TCID50 (0.5 mL 
inoculum) 
109 TCID50/g 
(Alexandersen S, 2001) 
Pharynx 105-106 TCID50/g 
Blood 107.5 TCID50/mL 102.5-103.75 DCP50/mL (Savi P, 1962) 
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Source of tissue, 
secretion, or 
excretion 
Initial virus inoculation Virus concentration at 
slaughter 
Reference 
Blood clot 
106 TCID50 (0.5 mL 
inoculum) 
104.8 TCID50/g 
(Chou CC, 2004) Lymph node 103.8 TCID50/g 
Muscle ND
Foot epithelium 
NP 
109.6 ID50/g 
(Sellers R, 1971) 
Blood 107.2 ID50/mL 
Bone marrow 106.1 ID50/g 
Liver 105.6 ID50/g 
Feces 102.9 ID50/g 
Lymph node 
108.9 TCID50/mL 
104.1 PFU/g (black pigs) 
102.7 PFU/g (white pigs) 
(Mebus CA, 1993) 
Blood  
104.3 PFU/mL (black pigs)  
102.8 PFU/mL (white pigs) 
Bone marrow  
102.7 PFU/g (black pigs)    
10 PFU/g (white pigs) 
Fat  
~6.31 PFU/g (black pigs) 
1.58 PFU/g (white pigs) 
Muscle  ND* 
Blood 
108.9 TCID50/mL 
103.6 PFU/mL 
(Mebus C, 1997) 
Lymph node 103.4 PFU/mL 
Bone marrow 101.9 PFU/mL 
Fat ~3.16 PFU/mL
Muscle ~1.1 PFU/mL
Muscle 
107.5 PFU/mL 
>105PFU/mL 
(Panina, GF 1989) 
Fat >105PFU/mL 
Muscle psoas NP 101.4-102.6** (Dhenin L, 1980) 
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Source of tissue, 
secretion, or 
excretion 
Initial virus inoculation Virus concentration at 
slaughter 
Reference 
Shoulder muscle 100.3-104.0 
Tenderloin muscle 101.0-101.4 
Lymph node 102.5-104.0 
Fat 101.0-102.6 
Tonsils 102.0-104.0 
NP: None reported 
ND*: None detected  - The average titer of the sampled pigs was slightly greater than 0 PFU/g, with two 
samples with titers 10 PFU/g 
**: Units not reported 
TCID50 (Median Tissue culture infectious dose) = The amount or quantity of a pathogenic agent (e.g. 
FMDv) required to produce a damaging effect to 50% of cells in the tissue inoculated. 
PFU (Plaque forming units) = Provides an estimation of the number of infectious viral particles present 
by measuring the number of clear areas (areas of cell lysis) that are formed for a given culture plate area. 
One PFU equals about 1.4 TCID50 for FMDv based on the equation by Horzinek (Horzinek MC, 1985). 
Detectable viral titers in different cattle tissues ranged from 102.5 PFU/g to 1010.6 PFU/g (Table 
15). As was the case with swine, the majority of reports in cattle were based on the ‘worst-case 
scenario’, where cattle were inoculated with high virus titers. The studies suggest that the greater 
quantities of virus were detected in heart muscle, adrenal glands, pharynx and lymph nodes 
(Burrows R, 1966). The lowest quantities of virus were found in nervous tissue and spleen 
((Scott FW, 1965); (Cottral GE, 1969)). Given the high viral titers found in these tissues, it is 
highly likely that FMDv would be present in cattle carcass tissues.  
Table 15: Titers of FMDv present in select tissues, excretions and secretions of cattle after 
slaughter. 
Source of tissue, 
secretion, or 
excretion 
Initial virus 
inoculation 
Virus concentration at 
slaughter 
Reference 
Pharynx - 107 (Burrows R. 1966) 
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Source of tissue, 
secretion, or 
excretion 
Initial virus 
inoculation 
Virus concentration at 
slaughter 
Reference 
Blood  
105.0 bovine 
ID50 U virus 
105.6 PFU/g (Cottral GE, 1969) 
Semen - 106.2 TCID50/mL (Sellers RF, 1968) 
Milk - 106.6 TCID50/mL (Donaldson AI, 1987)
Bone marrow 
105.0 bovine 
ID50 U virus 
105.9 PFU/g  (Cottral GE, 1969) 
Lymph nodes 
- 
108.2 PFU/g 
(Burrows R, 1981) Heart muscle 1010 PFU/g 
Adrenal gland 1010.6 PFU/g 
Thyroid gland 
105.0 bovine 
ID50 U virus 
106.0 PFU/g 
(Cottral GE, 1969) 
Pancreas  106.4 PFU/g 
Liver  103.6 PFU/g 
Rumen  106.4 PFU/g 
Spleen  103.1 PFU/g 
Kidney  104.0 PFU/g 
Cerebrum  
- 
102.5 PFU/g 
(Scott FW, 1965) 
Spinal cord 103.2 PFU/g 
Pineal body 104.3 PFU/g 
Pituitary  106.8 PFU/g 
Skin/Hides  - 106.0 PFU/g (Gailiunas P, 1966) 
7.1.5 FMDv concentration in the disposal truck 
Tables 16 and 17 show the weight ranges of different production phases and animal capacity at 
different size options for the standard rendering truck trailer. The concentration of the FMDv in 
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the disposal truck will depend on the number of viremic carcasses and the virus concentration 
per carcass. Table 17 shows that the total amount of FMDv contained in a 50000 lbs disposal 
truck is between 2x1011 and 2x1014 Plaque Forming Units. This FMDv concentration is 6-12 
times higher than the minimum infectious dose for cattle, pig and sheep for the inhalation route. 
Any small amount of body fluids escaping the truck would contain enough quantity of virus to 
potentially infect susceptible population.  
Table 16: Weight ranges of different species, depending on the production phase. 
Weight Ranges (lbs.) Dairy 
Calf (birth) 55-100 
Yearling (12 months) 520-1100 
Adult Cows/Bulls 800-1700 
Beef 
Calf (birth) 60-100 
Weaning (6-10 mo.) 450-700 
Market wt. (18-22 mo.) 1200-1400 
Swine 
Nursery pig up to 55 
Grower pig  55-154 
Finisher pig 154-330 
Table 17: Number of carcasses in a disposal truck, depending on the capacity
Animal weight 
(lbs) 
Disposal Vehicle Weight Capacity 
Trailer Weight 
Capacity 
Trailer Weight 
Capacity 
Trailer Weight 
Capacity 
(40,000 lbs) (45,000 lbs) (50,000 lbs) 
Trailer Length (ft) Trailer Length (ft) Trailer Length (ft) 
28' 32' 40' 
Number of carcasses per X lbs 
10 4000 4500 5000
25 1600 1800 2000
50 800 900 1000
100 400 450 500
200 200 225 250
300 133 150 167
400 100 113 125
500 80 90 100
600 67 75 83
700 57 64 71
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800 50 56 63
900 44 50 56
1000 40 45 50
1100 36 41 45
1200 33 38 42
1300 31 35 38
1400 29 32 36
1500 27 30 33
Table 18: Total amount of FMDv per disposal truck and growth phase
Type of farm 
Number of 
carcasses per 
truck (40') 
% of viremic 
carcasses 
Number of 
viremic carcasses 
Total amount of FMDv 
per truck (40') (PFU)* 
Calf Dairy cows 500 
78% 
390 
2x1014 
Yearling Dairy 
cows 
45 35
Adult Dairy 
cows 
29 23
Calf beef cow 500 390 
Weaning beef 
cow 
71 55
Market beef cow 36 28 
Nursery pig 1000 
82% 
780 
2x1011 Grower pig 350 273 
Finisher pig 150 117 
*: Average FMDv concentration per carcass is 106 PFU/g for cattle carcasses and 103 PFU/g for 
swine carcasses.  
Table 19: Selected estimated Minimum Infectious Doses (TCID50) for cattle, sheep and 
pigs by route of exposure 1, 2, 3 
Species Inhalation Nasal inoculation Oral 
Cattle 10 104-105 105-106
Sheep 10 104-105 105-106 
Pigs >800 Unknown 104-105 
1: Doses are given as TCID50 (50% bovine thyroid tissue culture dose endpoint estimates). 
2: One PFU equals about 1.4 TCID50 for FMDv. 
3: Source: Alexandersen S. Q., 2003; Donaldson AI, 1987. 
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7.2. Likelihood that transportation of carcasses will produce leakage and 
spillage of fluids contaminated with FMDv 
Summary: The volume of body fluids of carcasses will vary depending on the growth phase, 
body weight and species.  The time from depopulation to movement of carcasses to the disposal 
site will be very short (as a matter of hours), so the potential for body fluids to escape from 
carcasses (leachate) will be minimized. Mitigation measures such as sealed tailgate, tarp cover 
and the use of Bio-Zip  bags will minimize the likelihood of leakage and spillage of carcass 
fluids from the disposal truck. Likelihood estimation: The likelihood of leakage and spillage of 
carcass fluids from a standard rendering truck (sealed tailgate and tarp cover) will be low. 
Adding a Bio-Zip  bag will reduce the likelihood to between low and negligible for any 
type of truck. The rest of the scenarios (roll-off/dump trucks with/without tarp covering 
and liner) will have risk levels higher than low.  
7.2.1. Carcass fluids 
7.2.1.1. Leachate, Leakage and Spillage 
Leachate is the liquid that is produced by the decomposition of livestock carcasses when water 
travels through a burial site and picks up products from decomposing carcasses and carries them 
through the soil. This is a process that follows euthanasia as the carcass starts to decompose.  
Through literature search and expert opinion, ranges of leachate production for livestock were 
quantified.  Mammals are approximately 70% water and, as they decompose, they turn into a 
compost-like material capable of holding onto about 50% of that water (e.g., in a 50 lb. carcass, 
17.5 lb. of body weight will be lost during the leachate process). Due to the short time elapsed 
between euthanasia and disposal, post-mortem autolysis will be minimal. Leachate as a potential 
contributor to spillage will, thus, not be considered further in this risk assessment.  If time to 
disposal following euthanasia is extended, leachate may become more significant and warrant 
further consideration.   
Leakage is the volume of liquid matter (including feces, urine, blood, ingesta, serum, saliva, etc.) 
that could be released from the carcass upon euthanasia, but is not part of the decomposition 
process. This can happen post-mortem through various means, such as loss of sphincter tone, 
through maneuvering of carcasses, and through the site of euthanasia (e.g. captive bolt entry 
point). Leakage is a factor that could facilitate the release of FMDv from the truck during 
movement. Spillage is when carcass fluid from leachate or leakage spills out from the 
conveyance source into the environment and could potentially contribute to the spread of FMDv.      
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7.2.1.2. Amount of Carcass Fluids 
The table below summarizes the estimated body fluid volumes for cattle (both dairy and beef), as 
well as swine at different life stages.  This is based on fluid volume comprising about 70% of 
total weight for most mammals.  About two-thirds of these fluids are intracellular.   So for 
example, based on total body fluids on a per weight basis, the volume range for potential leakage 
under worst case scenario for a calf (beef or dairy) would range from 6 to 20 liters.  The volume 
of potential leakage from a nursery pig would range from 2 to 6 liters.  These fluid quantities 
provide a reference for the total potential volume of leakage by weight and species. They are not 
considered an estimate of expected leakage. 
Table 20: Volume of Body Fluids found in Cattle and Swine
Cattle 
Calf 
(birth) 
Weaning 
(6-10 mo.) 
Market wt. 
(18-22 
mo.) 
Min Max Min max Min max 
Weight, kg (lbs) 27 (59) 45 (99) 204 (449) 318 (700) 544 (1197) 810 (1782) 
Total Body Fluid Volume  (L) 19 32 143 223 381 567 
 Total Free Fluid Volume 
(that which is not 
intracellular) (L) 
6 10 48 74 127 189
Swine 
Nursery 
pig 
Grower 
pig  
Finisher 
pig 
Min Max Min max Min max 
Weight, kg (lbs) 10 (22) 25 (55) 26 (57) 70 (154) 70 (154) 150 (330) 
Total Body Fluid Volume (L) 7 18 18 49 49 105 
 Total Free Fluid Volume 
(that which is not 
intracellular) (L) 
2 6 6 16 16 35
7.2.2. Potential for Leakage and Spillage of Carcass Fluids during 
Movement  
In consulting with rendering industry experts on the typical amounts of leakage from fresh, intact 
carcasses under normal conditions, the body fluids normally remain in the carcass.  In a full load 
of a standard rendering truck (29–1000 carcasses), the amount of leakage that was estimated by 
expert opinion was around 20 liters per load.  The table below summarizes the likelihood of 
leakage and spillage of carcass fluids from intact carcasses during transport, with or without 
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further mitigation measures. The tarp covering will provide protection against aerosolization and 
spillage of carcass fluids, and the Bio-Zip  bag will provide full protection for any of the 
possible pathways. The liner would provide a leak-proof barrier for fluids with a full-
containment of carcasses and may aid in preventing spillage. It is not, however, sealed 
containment, such as with the sealed leak-proof tailgate or the Bio-Zip  bag.  
Table 21: Leakage and Spillage of carcass fluids during conveyance 
Comparison of Conveyance Methods and Mitigations Likelihood 
Standard Rendering Truck (sealed tailgate)* 
With tarp covering, and Bio-Zip bag Negligible 
With tarp covering  Low 
With Bio-Zip bag (uncovered)  Negligible 
Uncovered Moderate 
Roll-off Truck/Dump Truck (no seal properties)* 
With tarp covering, liner and Bio-Zip bag Negligible 
With tarp covering and liner Low to Moderate 
With tarp covering and Bio-Zip bag Negligible 
With liner only (uncovered) Moderate to High
With Bio-Zip only (uncovered) Low 
*: Capacity: 28', 32', 40' 
From the table, it can be concluded that the use of a Bio-Zip bag, with any of the vehicle types, 
will produce a negligible to low risk of leakage and spillage of fluids during conveyance. The 
scenario of the standard rendering truck or roll-off and dump truck without tarp covering would 
have a moderate to high likelihood of spillage, due to the proximity of carcasses to the top of the 
trailer in a full load. Without mitigations to prevent spillage from the truck (i.e. tarp), carcass 
fluids may have the potential to escape  
7.3.  Likelihood that transportation of carcasses will produce aerosolization 
of FMDv particles 
Summary:  Bioaerosol is a complex field of science where multiple parameters (e.g.., 
environmental, climatic) can affect the survival and air transmission of FMDv. Likelihood 
estimation: The overall likelihood of bioaerosols emanating from a trailer and spreading 
infectious virus through carcass transportation activities is estimated as negligible to low if 
conveyance is in a standard rendering truck with tarp covering. If aerosols could be 
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produced from the carcass leakage, there is a moderate likelihood they could then move 
into the airstream. 
7.3.1. Bioaerosol Science 
Aerosols refer to an assortment of liquid or solid particles suspended in a gaseous medium 
(Gilbert Y 2009).  Bioaerosols are aerosols that contain microorganisms, such as bacteria, fungi, 
and viruses—or organic compounds (endotoxins, metabolites, toxins, proteins from animals and 
plants, and other microbial fragments) (Macher J, 1999). The science of bioaerosols is extremely 
complex and requires an understanding of microbiology, biology, chemistry, meteorology, and 
aerosol physics (Mohr A, 2005). The sections below focus on the key points for general 
bioaerosol behavior that may pertain to FMDv associated bioaerosols.  The ability to generate 
bioaerosols depends on the source, aerosolization mechanisms, environmental conditions, and 
composition (Pillai SD, 2002). Bioaerosols vary in size from 20 nm to >100 μm in diameter. 
Almost any environmental reservoir for microorganisms, such as fresh and marine surface 
waters, soil, plants, wastes and animals, is susceptible to being a source of bioaerosols.  
Bioaerosols generated from water sources are generally surrounded by a thin layer of liquid that 
rapidly evaporates to give droplet nuclei. Droplet nuclei are the dried residue of larger aerosols 
that can remain airborne indefinitely on air currents. Transport of bioaerosols, and survival of 
airborne microorganisms, are influenced by many physical and environmental factors. The size, 
shape, and density of bioaerosols are of particular significance to transport because they are 
related to the aerodynamic diameter, which controls the settling velocity ((Cox C, 1995) (Mohr 
A, 2007)). Bioaerosols between 1 and 5 μm normally follow the pathlines of surrounding air, 
making them less susceptible than larger particles to impact surfaces and deposition (Mohr A, 
2007). 
7.3.2. Bioaerosols and FMDv 
The airborne transmission of FMDv aerosols is complex. Windborne transport of virus can occur 
under specific epidemiological, climatic, and meteorological conditions, but is very uncommon.  
Prevailing climatic conditions, particularly wind speed and the vertical temperature structure, are 
major determinants of physical decay of aerosols. This is also influenced by the roughness of the 
surface over which the air plume travels. The survival of FMDv in plumes is likely across 
seaways, as the surface turbulence is low and concentrations of airborne particles can be 
maintained for greater distances than over land (Gloster J, 2005).  The stability of FMDv is 
affected by radiation, RH, temperature, and weather factors. RH is the major meteorological 
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determinant affecting virus survival. It has been established that the virus is stable in aerosols at 
a RH above 60 percent and at temperatures below 33°C (91°F). Sunlight and a pollution complex 
termed “the outside air factor” have minimal direct effect on virus survival (Donaldson AI, 
1975). The aerosols, once airborne, are subject to both physical and biological loss. Biologically, 
the virus may become inactivated if the RH of the air falls below 60 percent or the water vapor 
pH of the aerosol particle becomes acidic or alkaline (Gloster J, 2004). In the absence of 
turbulence, particles greater than 10 μm are likely to be removed from the atmosphere within 
minutes. Smaller particles may remain airborne for several hours and be carried many kilometers 
in the wind (Gloster J, 2007). Particles of 5 μm or less act as vapors and can move in and follow 
an airstream without impacting obstacles; this is the size of particle that represents the worst risk. 
It is unknown if bioaerosols from leakage of carcass fluids would require the same type of 
environmental conditions to remain viable and potentially lead to infection of susceptible 
livestock. 
7.3.3. Expert Opinion on Bioaerosolization 
There are no studies on carcass bioaerosols production in the literature. Bioaerosol science is a 
very complex field, and aerosol characteristics and behavior are measured quantitatively using 
sophisticated sampling methods and equipment. Questions on aerosol behavior cannot be 
accurately modeled mathematically, as it requires knowledge of the concentration of aerosols, 
the size distribution of aerosols, the media composition, and the environmental/atmospheric 
conditions under which they are generated. Due to the lack of information on carcass aerosols, 
the experts’ opinions and rationale were based on extrapolation of their knowledge in aerosol 
science. All of the experts agreed that experimentation is required to accurately answer these 
questions and to validate their opinions. 
We queried three bioaerosol experts on the potential for generation of bioaerosols during 
transport and the expected behavior of the aerosols. The experts have different professional 
backgrounds and expertise within the field of aerosol science. The list of experts interviewed, the 
questions asked and a summary table of their answers are presented in Appendix G: Expert 
Opinion – Aerosols. Responses were compiled and compared for consensus between experts. 
The explanation of aerosol behavior varied slightly among experts, but the overall conclusions of 
the probability of occurrence of bioaerosols did not vary significantly.  Expert opinion consensus 
was that the likelihood of aerosolization in an uncovered rendering vehicle during transportation 
was negligible to moderate.  When the rendering vehicle was covered during transportation, 
expert opinion consensus was that the likelihood of aerosolization was negligible to low.  
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Table 22: Summary of bioaerosol responses from experts. 
Questions posed to the experts Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3 
Aerosolization in uncovered rendering vehicle during 
transportation 
What is the likelihood (see chart) of significant aerosolization of 
carcasses fluids during transportation? 
Moderate Low Negligible 
What is the likelihood that a significant portion of the aerosolized 
particles be less than 10 µm in size 
Moderate Low -
If aerosols could be produced from the carcass leakage, what is 
the likelihood they could then move into the airstream at a farm? 
High Moderate - 
Aerosolization in covered rendering vehicle during 
transportation 
What is the likelihood (see chart) of significant aerosolization of 
carcasses fluids during transportation? 
Low Negligible  Negligible 
What is the likelihood that a significant portion of the aerosolized 
particles be less than 10 µm in size 
Low - -
If aerosols could be produced from the carcass leakage, what is 
the likelihood they could then move into the airstream at a farm? 
Moderate - - 
7.3.4. Potential for Aerosolization of Carcass Fluids during Movement  
The likelihood estimate was based on the review of expert opinion, observation of truck design 
and operations, and current knowledge of FMDv epidemiology.  The overall likelihood of 
bioaerosols emanating from a trailer with potential for spreading infectious virus through carcass 
transportation activities is estimated as low to moderate, if conveyance is in an uncovered 
standard rendering truck. When using a tarp covering, the likelihood was reduced to negligible-
low, and with a Bio-Zip bag to negligible.  In this case, if aerosols could be produced from the 
carcass leakage, there is a moderate to high likelihood they could then move into the airstream.  
Experts rated the likelihood of FMDv moving from the airstream into farms along the truck route 
as between moderate and high when trailer is uncovered, and between negligible to moderate 
when covered. 
Risk	Assessment	for	the	Transmission	of	Foot	and	Mouth	Disease	via	Movement	of	Swine	and	Cattle	
Carcasses	from	FMD‐infected	Premises	to	a	Disposal	Site	 Page	53	
Table 23: Aerosolization of virus particles during conveyance
Comparison of Conveyance Methods and Mitigations  Likelihood 
Standard Rendering Truck (sealed tailgate)* 
With tarp covering, and Bio-Zip bag Negligible 
With tarp covering  Negligible-Low 
With Bio-Zip bag (uncovered)  Negligible 
Uncovered Low-Moderate 
Roll-off Truck/Dump Truck (no seal properties)* 
With tarp covering, liner and Bio-Zip bag Negligible 
With tarp covering and liner Negligible-Low 
With tarp covering and Bio-Zip bag Negligible 
With liner only (uncovered) Low to Moderate
With Bio-Zip only (uncovered) Negligible 
*: Capacity: 28', 32', 40'. 
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8. Exposure Assessment
The exposure assessment is an evaluation of the potential exposure pathways by which 
susceptible animals could be exposed to infectious amounts of FMDv. There are four major 
aspects of the exposure assessment: the exposed population, the pathway of exposure, the 
magnitude of exposure, and the likelihood of exposure. For the purpose of this assessment, the 
population of interest is primarily susceptible agriculture livestock species. The potential 
pathways for exposure are through the cross-contamination of trucks, personnel or equipment by 
FMDv contaminated carcass fluids, and exposure to aerosolized particles. These events and the 
factors associated with virus survival and infectiveness are uncertain.  
For the exposure assessment of this risk assessment, the use of a standard rendering truck was 
assumed. In the entry assessment, the likelihood of the FMDv to be released during 
transportation was estimated to be between negligible to low (both for aerosolization and 
spillage). Based on the proposed mitigations in this assessment and the apparent effectiveness on 
the likelihood of virus to be released by the movement of carcasses, we conclude that the 
likelihood of exposure to FMDv by susceptible populations during the movement of infected 
carcasses will be negligible.  
9. Risk Estimation
The risk of FMD infection of susceptible livestock associated with the movement of swine and 
cattle carcasses by leakage, spillage and aerosolization of carcass fluids will be negligible when 
using a standard rendering truck (tailgate sealed and tarp cover) and a Bio-Zip bag, between 
negligible and low when using a standard rendering truck or a roll-off /dump truck with a Bio-
Zip bag. Other scenarios (uncovered standard rendering trucks, uncovered roll-off/dump 
trucks, covered roll-off/dump trucks and a liner) will have risk levels higher than low (moderate 
to high). 
10.  Conclusions
The following conclusions were drawn from this report: 
 Conveyances evaluated will contain carcasses with a total FMDv amount that will exceed
in several degrees of magnitude the minimum FMD infective dose for pigs and cattle.
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 The use of Bio-Zip bags is an effective mitigation to reduce the risk of leakage and
aerosolization to negligible in standard rendering trucks and to low in the other
conveyance types.
11.  Recommendations for further research
An important goal of the risk assessment process is to inform the risk managers about the data 
gaps encountered during the production of the document and research strategies to fulfill the data 
gaps, in order to decrease the uncertainty in the risk estimation. 
A review of the literature on FMDv in cattle and swine indicated the following data gaps, 
research needs and uncertainties: 
1. The amount of virus that would be present in naturally infected animals and their
tissues. It may be significantly lower than the doses that have been used in scientific
research. Some variables that could be studied include: strains of FMDv, post-
exposure intervals, age/size of pig/cattle.
2. Data on infectivity of waste materials (i.e. aerosols, liquids, and solids) generated
during 3D operations (i.e. Depopulation, Disposal, and Decontamination).
3. Confirmation on how FMD infected carcasses will be classified for transportation
purposes, especially under the circumstances of mass depopulation, with the
possibility that infected carcasses could be designated with a different classification.
In the case of a FMD outbreak, it is possible that the Federal HazMat Transport
Regulations could be used to cover transportation.  However, the Code of Federal
Regulations 49 CFR Part 175 addresses the movement of test samples and vials, but
not intact infected carcasses.
4. New modeling approaches that contain the aerosol route of infection or cross-
contamination within groups (personnel and equipment) need to be explored.
5. Research on the aerosolization of FMD is limited or lacking.  Expert opinion was
used in this assessment, but targeted research would add additional data and
confidence to the issue.
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Appendix A: Model Disease Spread 
This appendix provide additional information on the disease spread model used to simulate the 
spread of FMDv within a swine and cattle group and estimate the number of pig and cows in 
various disease states at different time periods.  The disease states included in the module are 
susceptible (S), latent (L), pre-clinically infected stage (I), clinically infected (C) and (R) 
(Carpenter, 2004). The module updates the number of pig/cows in the disease states at specific 
time steps (e.g., every 6 hours). The uncertainties in input variables as well as the inherent 
variability associated with FMD infection course in a pig/cow and spread within the group were 
considered in the model.   
Assumptions and Notation 
We have the following notation for this section: 
N- The number of pig/cows in the group. 
i - index of pig/cows in the farm i ∈ 1,… , ܰ 
t - index of time periods. i ∈ 1,… , ݐ 
ࡿ෡(t)- Set of indices of pig/cows that are in a susceptible state in time period t 
ࡸ෠ሺ࢚ሻ- Set of indices of pig/cows that are in a latent state in time period t 
ࡿࡵ෢ሺ࢚ሻ- Set of indices of pig/cows that are in a pre-clinically infectious state in time period t 
࡯ࡵ෢ሺ࢚ሻ- Set of indices of pig/cows that are in a clinically infectious state in time period t 
ࡾ෡ሺ࢚ሻ- Set of indices of pig/cows that are in an immune state in time period t.    
Pt- The probability that a pig/cow that is susceptible in period t becomes infected with FMD by 
period t+1. 
௜ܰ	ሺݐሻ-The number of infectious pig/cows/cows/cows in time period t.  
K-The adequate contact rate is defined as the expected number of contacts that a pig/cow has 
with other pigs/cows in a time period that are adequate to transmit FMD infection.  
ܫ௧,௧ାଵ௡௘௪	-The number of newly infected pig/cows between period t and t+1.  
௦ܰ	 ሺݐሻ- The number of susceptible pig/cows in period t. 
		߬௅ሺ݅ሻ- A model variable denoting the length of the latently infected period for a pig/cow in a 
specific simulation iteration.  This parameter was simulated using an exponential distribution as 
detailed in section 9.3 
		߬ௌூሺ݅ሻ- A model variable denoting the length of the pre-clinically infectious period for a 
pig/cow/cow in a specific simulation iteration.  This parameter was simulated using a lognormal 
distribution as detailed in section 9.3 
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		߬஼ூሺ݅ሻ- A model variable denoting the length of the clinically infectious period for a 
pig/cow/cow in a specific simulation iteration. This parameter was simulated using a gamma 
distribution as detailed in section 9.3 
ܶ௅ሺ݅ሻ- A model variable denoting the simulation time at which a pig/cow/cow i entered into 
latently infected state. 
ܶௌூሺ݅ሻ- A model variable denoting the simulation time at which a pig/cow/cow i entered into pre 
clinically infectious state. 
ܶ஼ூሺ݅ሻ- A model variable denoting the simulation time at which a pig/cow i entered into 
clinically infectious state. 
λ- The number of hours represented by each time period t of the simulation model. λ was set at 6 
hours in our simulations. 
The main assumptions associated with this model are listed below 
 The pig/cows that are in susceptible state in a time period, all have an identical probability of
becoming infected by the next period, (i.e., differences in transmission due to grouping of
pig/cows in pens are not considered).
 Pre-clinically infectious or clinically infectious pig/cows are both equally infective with
respect to transmitting FMD, if they have an adequate contact with a susceptible pig/cow.
 The number of adequate contacts per pig/cow in a period follows the Poisson distribution.
 The variability in adequate contact rate due to differences in density of pig/cows (number of
pig or cows per unit area) among different swine or cattle operations is not considered (i.e.,
the transmission is modeled as being frequency dependent).
 The clinically immune state is not considered in the model
The Transmission Equation  
The transmission equation estimates the number of susceptible pig/cows that become newly 
infected with FMD in each time period. The transmission equation is based on calculation of the 
probability that a susceptible pig/cow has an adequate contact with at least one infected pig/cow 
in a time period. The variables considered in the equation include the adequate contact rate, the 
number of infectious pig/cows, the number of susceptible pig/cows and the total number of 
pig/cows in the farm. In general, a higher adequate contact rate or higher proportion of infectious 
pig/cows will lead to increased transmission. We use the transmission equation derived in Dietz 
and Schenzle (Dietz K, 1985) as shown in Equation 1. This transmission equation assumes that 
the number of adequate contacts each pig/cow has in a period is Poisson distributed with a mean 
(k). A Poisson process indicates a continuous and constant opportunity for an event to occur.   
௧ܲ ൌ 1 െ ݁ି
௞ሺே೔ሺ௧ሻሻேିଵ
ܫ௧,௧ାଵ௡௘௪	~ܤ݅݊݋݈݉݅ܽሺܵ, ௧ܲሻ 
Transition between Different Disease States 
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The transmission equation provides the basis for calculating the number of pigs/cows 
transitioning from susceptible to the latently infected state in one time period. In this section, we 
briefly describe the implementation details for transitions between other disease states.  As stated 
earlier, the model updates the disease states of the pig/cows in unit time steps (e.g., 6 hours). The 
transitions from latently infected to pre-clinically infectious, pre-clinically infectious to clinically 
infectious and from clinically infectious to recovered are based on keeping track of each 
individual pig/cow’s length of each disease state and timing of when a pig/cow transitioned into 
a disease state. For instance, in the case of transitioning between the latent to preclinical infected 
state for a pig/cow, the model first calculates the length of the latent period for the pig/cow (߬௅) 
based on the latent time distribution. The model also keeps tracks of the time period when a 
pig/cow transitioned into the latently infected state (ܶ௅). The model transitions the pig/cow from 
the latently infected to sub-clinically infected state in the first time period t where t*λ ≥		߬௅+ܶ௅. 
Other disease state transitions are performed in a similar manner. The main input parameters for 
this section of the model are the probability distributions of latent, sub clinically infectious and 
clinically infectious time periods. The model can be run for a specified number of time periods 
and provides the estimates of number of pig/cows in various disease states 
1 
WM 
Bio-Zip Rev. 2.0 
Sealable Liner 
Product Description 
The BIO-ZIP SEALABLE LINER is a cleaner way of managing large volume biological 
waste streams and potential odor, leakage, disease, and environmental contamination issues.  
Constructed using proprietary coated layers of polypropylene-based material also featuring an 
industrial grade zippered sealing system, the BIO-ZIP Sealable Liner fits securely inside 
industrial roll-off containers, trailers or truck racks from 10 to 40 cubic yards in total volume. 
It's easy to install, capable of containing large, heavy loads and will slips right out when it's 
time. ONE SIZE FITS ALL. 
Typical Physical Properties and Performance Characteristics  
A. Dimensions: 
Approximate Nominal Thickness 96 mil-105 mil 
Physical Dimension See attached Engineering Drawing 
Standard Folded Size 44”W X 48”L X16”H 
Weight per unit 98 lbs 
B. Typical Physical Properties and Performance Characteristics 
Nylon Coil Zipper 
PROPERTY TEST METHOD UNITS US 
Crosswise Strength of Chain ASTM D-2061-93 254 lbs 
Holding Strength of Separable Units ASTM D-2061-93 70.1 lbs 
Resistance to Pull Off of Slider Pull ASTM D-2061-93 141.8 lbs 
Salt Spray Exposure Operational and Functional 
Technical Data June 2007
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Bio-Zip Rev. 2.0 
Typical Physical Properties and Performance Characteristics (Continued) 
6000 DENIER Thread 
PROPERTY TEST METHOD UNITS US 
Construction 1000 denier 6ply continuous 
filament 
Elongation ASTM D-882 17% 
Tensile ASTM D-882 105 lbs 
Finish Silicone 4%-6%
7.5 oz Inner Coated Water Proof Layer (proprietary coating) 
PROPERTY TEST METHOD UNITS US 
Weight  7.4oz
Thickness ASTM D-5199 86.0 mils 
Coating ASTM D-5199 3mils 
Grab Tensile ASTM D-4632 290 lbs 
Elongation ASTM D-822 45% 
Mullen Burst ASTM D-3786 350 psi 
Trapezoidal Tear Strength ASTM D-4533 50 lbs 
Puncture Strength ASTM D-4833 120 lbs 
3.0 oz Coated Polypropylene Outer Layer (proprietary coating) 
PROPERTY TEST METHOD UNITS US 
Weight  ASTM D-1910 3.7 oz/yd2 
Thickness ASTM D-5199 11mill min 
Tensile Strength Warp ASTM D-4623 140 lbs 
Tensile Strength Weft ASTM D-4632 132 lbs 
Puncture ASTM D-4355 69 lbs 
C. Environmental Resistance 
PROPERTY TEST METHOD UNITS US 
7.5 oz Inner Water Proof Coated Layer 
UV Resistance (after 500 hrs) 
ASTM D-4355 70% Strength 
3.0 oz Water Proof Coated Outer 
Protective Layer 
UV Resistance (after 1200 hrs) 
ASTM D-4355 >70% Strength 
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Bio-Zip Rev. 2.0
Safety and Regulatory 
• Material is 100% solids and contains no hazardous air pollutants
• Hazard rating: Zero rating for health, fire and reactivity and is zero class flammability
• Disposal: Meets US regulations for landfillable materials.
Manufacturing  
• Lead Time
 Emergency Request: 24 hour lead-time, 25% expedite fee will apply with a 20-50 bag
daily capacity.
 Non-Emergency- Two week lead-time is required and a 20-50 bag daily capacity
• Capacity
 Daily Maximum Capacity- 75-100 units per day
Shipping and Storage 
• Shipping
 Pallet Dimensions- 49”Wx52”L
 Bio-Zip Dimension Folded- 44”WX48”LX16”H
 Units Per Pallet-5
 Weight Per unit-98 lbs
 Weight Per Pallet-540 lbs (98 lbs x 5 +Pallet (50 lbs)
• Units per Semi-Trailer
 48’ Semi-trailer-22 pallets (110 Bio-Zip bags)
 52’ Semi-trailer-24 pallets (120 Bio-Zip bags)
• Storage
 Optimal Storage:  Climate control- shelf life 20 years
 Covered, out of direct sunlight and out of elements: 5-10 years
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Drawing 1.0    Bio-Zip Engineering Drawing 
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Appendix C: Federal and State Regulations for Carcass Movement 
Federal Regulations 
Summary 1: Code of Federal Regulations, pertaining to carcass transportation 
CFR 
APHIS 
Title 9 - Animals and Animal 
Products » CHAPTER III--
FOOD SAFETY AND 
INSPECTION SERVICE, 
DEPARTMENT OF 
AGRICULTURE » 
SUBCHAPTER A--
AGENCY ORGANIZATION 
AND TERMINOLOGY; 
MANDATORY MEAT AND 
POULTRY PRODUCTS 
INSPECTION AND 
VOLUNTARY 
INSPECTION AND 
CERTIFICATION» Part 325-
-TRANSPORTATION » § 
325.20 Transportation and 
other transactions concerning 
dead, dying, disabled, or 
diseased livestock, and parts 
of carcasses of livestock that 
died otherwise than by 
slaughter. 
No person engaged in the business of buying, selling, or transporting in commerce, or importing 
any dead, dying, disabled or diseased animals or parts of the carcasses of any animals that died 
otherwise than by slaughter shall: 
(a) Buy, sell, transport, or offer for sale or transportation, in commerce, or import any dead 
livestock if its hide or skin has been removed; 
(b) Sell, transport, offer for sale or transportation, or receive for transportation, in commerce, any 
dead, dying, disabled, or diseased livestock, or parts of the carcasses of any livestock that died 
otherwise than by slaughter, unless such livestock and parts are consigned and delivered, without 
avoidable delay, to establishments of animal food manufacturers, renderers, or collection stations 
that are registered as required by part 320 of this subchapter, or to official establishments that 
operate under Federal inspection, or to establishments that operate under a State or Territorial 
inspection system approved by the Secretary as one that imposes requirements at least equal to the 
Federal requirements for purposes of paragraph 301(c) of the Act;4 
4 A list of such registrants, States, and amendments thereof, will be published in the Federal 
Register, and information concerning the registration status of particular animal food 
manufacturers, renderers, or collection stations, or the status of particular States or Territories may 
also be obtained from the Director, Administrative Management Staff, Food Safety and Inspection 
Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC 20250. 
(c) Buy in commerce or import any dead, dying, disabled, or diseased livestock or parts of the 
carcasses of any livestock that died otherwise than by slaughter, unless he is an animal food 
manufacturer or renderer and is registered as required by part 320 of this subchapter, or is the 
operator of an establishment inspected as required by paragraph (b) of this section and such 
livestock or parts of carcasses are to be delivered to establishments eligible to receive them under 
paragraph (b) of this section; 
(d) Unload en route to any establishment eligible to receive them under paragraph (b) of this 
section, any dead, dying, disabled, or diseased livestock or parts of the carcasses of any livestock 
that died otherwise than by slaughter, which are transported in commerce or imported by any such 
person: Provided, That any such dead, dying, disabled, or diseased livestock, or parts of carcasses 
may be unloaded from a means of conveyance en route where necessary in case of a wreck or 
otherwise extraordinary emergency, and may be reloaded into another means of conveyance; but in 
all such cases, the carrier shall immediately report the facts by telegraph or telephone to the 
Compliance Staff, Meat and Poultry Inspection Field Operations, Food Safety and Inspection 
Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC 20250. 
(e) Load into any means of conveyance containing any dead, dying, disabled, or diseased livestock, 
or parts of the carcasses of any livestock that died otherwise than by slaughter, while in the course 
of importation or other transportation in commerce any livestock or parts of carcasses not within 
the foregoing description or any other products or other commodities. 
Title 9 - Animals and Animal 
Products » CHAPTER III--
FOOD SAFETY AND 
INSPECTION SERVICE, 
DEPARTMENT OF 
AGRICULTURE » 
SUBCHAPTER A--
AGENCY ORGANIZATION 
AND TERMINOLOGY; 
MANDATORY MEAT AND 
POULTRY PRODUCTS 
INSPECTION AND 
All vehicles and other means of conveyance used by persons subject to § 325.20 for transporting in 
commerce or importing, any dead, dying, disabled, and diseased livestock or parts of carcasses of 
livestock that died otherwise than by slaughter shall be leak-proof and so constructed and equipped 
as to permit thorough cleaning and sanitizing. The means of conveyance so used in conveying such 
livestock, or parts thereof, shall be cleaned and disinfected prior to use in the transportation of any 
product intended for use as human food. The cleaning procedure shall include the complete 
removal from the means of conveyance of any fluid, parts, or product of such dead, dying, disabled, 
or diseased livestock and the thorough application of a disinfectant to the interior surfaces of the 
cargo space. Substances permitted for such use are: 
(a) “Liquified phenol” (U.S.P. strength 87 percent phenol) in the proportion of at least 6 fluid 
ounces to 1 gallon of water. 
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VOLUNTARY 
INSPECTION AND 
CERTIFICATION» Part 325-
-TRANSPORTATION » § 
325.21 Means of conveyance 
in which dead, dying, 
disabled, or diseased livestock 
and parts of carcasses thereof 
shall be transported.
(b) “Cresylic disinfectant” in the proportion of not less than 4 fluid ounces to 1 gallon of water; and 
such other disinfectants as are approved by the Administrator in specific cases. The use of “cresylic 
disinfectant” is permitted subject to the conditions prescribed in § 71.10(b) of this title. 
DOT 
Title 49 › Subtitle B › Chapter 
I › Subchapter A › Part 105 - 
Hazardous Materials Program 
Definitions And General 
Procedures
Infectious Substances, CFR 49, 173.134   Class 6, Division 6.2 
(1) Division 6.2 (Infectious substance) means a material known or reasonably expected to 
contain a pathogen. A pathogen is a microorganism (including bacteria, viruses, rickettsiae, 
parasites, fungi) or other agent, such as a proteinaceous infectious particle (prion), that can cause 
disease in humans or animals. An infectious substance must be assigned the identification number 
UN 2814, UN 2900, UN 3373, or UN 3291 as appropriate, and must be assigned to one of the 
following 
Category A 
An infectious substance in a form capable of causing permanent disability or life-threatening or 
fatal disease in otherwise healthy humans or animals when exposure to it occurs. An exposure 
occurs when an infectious substance is released outside of its protective packaging resulting in 
physical contact with humans or animals. 
Category B 
An infectious substance that is not in a form generally capable of causing generally capable of 
causing permanent disability or life  
threatening or fatal disease in healthy humans or animals when exposure occurs; incl. Cat B trans. 
for diagnostic or investigational purposes 
Summary 2 - Examples of State Carcass Transportation Regulations 
State  Regulations 
Kansas   http://kansasstatutes.lesterama.org/Chapter_47/Article_12/ 
47-1209: Transportation of carcasses of domestic animals and packing house refuse; conditions and limitations. 
All vehicles used in the transportation upon public highways of the carcasses of any domestic animals or 
packinghouse refuse, shall conform with the following conditions and limitations: 
      (1)   The carcasses of dead animals or packinghouse refuse, shall be placed in containers or vehicles which 
are constructed of, or lined with, impervious material, and which do not permit the escape of any liquid 
      (2)   after original loading, the carcasses of domestic animals shall not be moved from the transporting 
container or vehicle upon a public highway or in any other place except at the disposal plant, at an authorized 
substation, or at an authorized place for transfer of carcasses or refuse into line vehicles; 
      (3)   containers and vehicles shall be disinfected each time before leaving a disposal plant, or substation, and 
the exterior thereof shall be disinfected each time after loading and before entering the public highway, all in 
conformance with requirements and regulations prescribed by the commissioner; 
      (4)   containers and vehicles used for transporting of carcasses of animals or packinghouse refuse shall not 
be used for the transportation of live animals except to a licensed disposal plant or the transportation of food or 
feed for human or livestock consumption until properly cleaned and sterilized. 
Wisconsin http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/95/50 
5.50 Transportation and disposal of animal carcasses.  
(2) Carcass transportation and disposal prohibitions. No person may do any of the following, either directly or 
through an employee or agent: 
(a) Transport or dispose of a carcass that the person knows or reasonably should know to be a diseased carcass 
in a manner that creates a significant and foreseeable risk of transmitting disease to humans or animals. 
(b) Dispose of a carcass in the waters of the state. This paragraph does not prohibit the use of farm-raised fish 
as bait. 
(4) Regulation of carcass transportation and disposal. The department may, by rule or order, regulate the 
transportation and disposal of carcasses to prevent and control contagious and infectious diseases. 
Florida https://www.flrules.org/gateway/ChapterHome.asp?Chapter=5C-23 
5C-23.003 Transporting or Hauling Animal Carcasses or Refuse; Procedures; Records; Equipment; Quarantine. 
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(1) A copy of the official permit shall be kept in each vehicle used for transporting or hauling animal 
carcasses or refuse. 
(2) Any person transporting or hauling animal carcasses or refuse shall keep records regarding the 
collection, transportation and distribution of animal carcasses or refuse. Such records must include the names 
and addresses of persons, firms and partnerships or corporations for which animal carcasses or refuse is being 
transported and cover the previous twelve months of operation. 
(3) All vehicles and/or containers used to transport or haul animal carcasses or refuse shall be thoroughly 
cleaned and disinfected weekly or more often if deemed necessary by a representative of the Division. Each 
operator shall be responsible for the proper cleaning of his vehicles and/or containers. 
(4) Vehicle and/or containers used to transport or haul animal carcasses or refuse which do not meet the 
requirement of this rule shall be placed under quarantine by the department until they are in compliance with 
this Chapter and proper cleaning and disinfection of the same has occurred 
Texas  
http://info.sos.state.tx.us/pls/pub/readtac$ext.TacPage?sl=R&app=9&p_dir=&p_rloc=&p_tloc=&p_ploc=&pg=1&p
_tac=&ti=4&pt=2&ch=59&rl=12 
(a) Purpose: Livestock in Texas are subject to a variety of highly contagious, foreign animal diseases (FAD). The 
infection or exposure of Texas livestock to a FAD would create an animal health emergency requiring the 
commission to respond as expediently as possible. A FAD may be very contagious; it may affect both farm/ranch 
animals and wildlife in Texas, and it may be extremely difficult to identify, isolate, control, and eradicate. It may 
spread to other areas in the state or other states and countries if the outbreak is not controlled in an expedient or 
effective manner. Any time delay in responding to such an emergency could cause a severe impact to, or even 
destroy, the agricultural economic stability and viability of the State and possibly the Nation. The purpose of this 
section is to authorize the executive director to be able to respond quickly and restrict the movement of livestock 
from specific areas or facilities in order to reduce any potential exposure of Texas livestock to a disease as provided 
in §58.2 of this title (relating to Disease Control). 
(b) Emergency Response Movement Restrictions: As a control measure, the commission by rule may regulate the 
movement of livestock in this state. Movement restrictions contained in this section are to become effective upon a 
determination that there is exposure to a disease or an agent of transmission of one of the diseases as identified in 
§58.2 of this title (relating to Disease Control) and that these restrictions are necessary to protect livestock in this
state. 
(c) Executive Director Authority: The executive director may restrict movement of livestock in any part or all of the 
state, through this section, if the executive director determines that livestock are exposed or infected with a disease 
as identified in §58.2 of this title (relating to Disease Control) and believes that the disease presents a danger to the 
public health or livestock industry and that the executive director considers it necessary to protect livestock in this 
state, by restricting movement under this subchapter. The executive director may require testing, vaccination, or 
another epidemiologically sound procedure in order to authorize movement from restricted locations. 
(d) Effect of Movement Restrictions: These movement restrictions will remain in effect until the executive director 
has determined that the exposure to the disease or infection from the disease has been eradicated or controlled. 
(e) Inspection of Shipment of Animals or Animal Products: An agent of the commission is entitled to stop and 
inspect a shipment of animals or animal products being transported in this state in order to determine if the shipment 
originated from a quarantined area or herd; or determine if the shipment presents a danger to the public health or 
livestock industry through insect infestation or through a communicable or noncommunicable disease. An 
authorized agent of the commission may issue a hold under this chapter to detain a shipment of animals or animal 
products in order to determine if the shipment had been exposed to a disease as identified in §58.2 of this title 
(relating to Disease Control) or to determine if the shipment is being transported in violation of this chapter. The 
authorized agent of the commission may require that the shipment be unloaded at the nearest place designated as 
appropriate unloading/loading and boarding facility in order to assess health status or to protect against possible 
exposure from a disease provided by §58.2 of this title. 
(f) Restricted Movement Locations: If the executive director has determined that there is an animal health 
emergency and that there is a need to restrict movement of livestock, then movement of livestock is restricted, until 
authorized by the commission through an agent of the commission, at the following locations: 
  (1) Livestock Market; 
  (2) Feedlots; 
  (3) Shows, Fairs and Exhibitions; 
  (4) Any premise where a caretaker for livestock has received written notice that movement restrictions are in place 
based on possible exposure to a disease as identified in §58.2 of this title (relating to Disease Control). 
(g) Notice of Restrictions: Restricted movement from locations provided for in subsection (f) of this section are 
effective upon receipt of notice in accordance with §58.22 of this title (relating to Notice of Livestock Movement 
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Restrictions). 
(h) Statewide application or part of state: The movement restrictions contained in this section can be made effective 
for all or part of the state in order to protect against exposure from a disease as identified in §58.2 of this title 
(relating to Disease Control). 
 
Georgia http://agr.georgia.gov/Data/Sites/1/media/ag_animalindustry/equine/files/laws/ocga4-5-
1disposalofdeadanimals527031.pdf 
Dead animals or parts thereof, raw or unrendered, except green salted hides, shall not be allowed to enter  
the State of Georgia except by written permit issued by the Georgia Department of Agriculture; provided, 
however, that licensed research institutes, accredited colleges or state colleges and universities, and  
departments of municipal governments may transport and receive dead animals for research or  
investigational purposes only. (Ga. L. 1969, p. 1018, § 7.)3 
4-5-9 Prohibition or restriction on transport of dead animals; permit issuance. 
The Commissioner of Agriculture may prohibit or restrict, at his or her discretion, and issue permits for  
the hauling or transportation of dead animals or types of dead animals and order the destruction thereof in 
accordance with this chapter.  
Maine  www.maine.gov/sos/cec/rules/01/001/001c211.doc 
SECTION 15. TRANSPORTATION OF POULTRY AND LIVESTOCK CARCASSES 
1. Secure Containers - Poultry or livestock carcasses transported over any public road shall be transported in
secure containers. 
2. Diseased Carcasses - Carcasses from animals that died or were slaughtered due to a disease outbreak may
only be transported from the farm or other regulated facility where they originated with the permission of the 
Commissioner. A written biosecurity plan shall be required prior to transportation of diseased carcasses. 
Minnesota http://www.vetmed.state.mn.us/portals/22/BAH%20Rule%20Book.pdf 
Disposal of Dead Animals and Rendering Plants  
1719.0200 Permits. Subpart 1. Generally. Permits from the board are required for all trucks used to transport 
carcasses or discarded animal parts over public roads. The permit authorizes the permittee to transport the 
carcasses or discarded animal parts over public roads to an establishment but does not authorize crossing state 
lines. Permits are valid for one year unless revoked in accordance with Minnesota Statutes, section  
35.93. The permittee shall comply with rules of other state and federal agencies. No permit is required for a 
person to haul the carcass of an animal which was owned by that person before the animal died.  
1719.0310 Trucks crossing state lines.  
Trucks crossing state lines must meet applicable conditions in any reciprocal agreement between the states 
involved.  
1719.0400 Truck owned by person other than owner or operator of rendering plant.  
If a truck is owned by a person other than the owner or operator of the establishment, the owner or operator of 
the truck and the owner or operator of the establishment are responsible for compliance with all laws and rules 
pertaining to the transportation of carcasses. The application must indicate the name and address of the owner 
of the truck.  
1719.0500 Inspection of plant facilities and trucks.  
Subpart 1. Generally. Before permits are issued, an inspection of the plant, collecting station, and trucks  
must be made by an agent of the board to determine if the facilities of the plant and the trucks comply  with this 
chapter. A report of the inspection must be filed with the board.  
Subp. 2. Repealed by amendment, 20 SR 2033 
Wyoming http://legisweb.state.wy.us/statutes/titles/Title11/T11CH23AR3.htm 
ARTICLE 3 - TRANSPORTATION OF CARCASSES TO RENDERING PLANTS 
 11-23-301. Generally; exceptions. 
With the consent of the owner, unless removal is contrary to state, county or local sanitary regulations or in the 
opinion of the state veterinarian might result in spreading contagious or infectious disease or threaten the health 
of human beings, animals or poultry, carcasses of animals may be transported to any rendering plant legally 
operating without prior inspection for brands and ownership. The operator of a rendering plant within this state 
receiving the carcasses is a hide buyer and shall comply with W.S. 11-23-201 through 11-23-207. 
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Appendix D: Expert Opinion – Rendering 
Expert opinion was sought on standard carcass transportation practices. Rendering companies 
have expertise in mass carcass removal and conveyance on a daily basis.  Central Bi-Products, a 
full service rendering company that operates two complexes in Redwood Falls, MN and in Long 
Prairie, MN was contacted to provide expert opinion on carcass transportation in the rendering 
industry.   
Expert opinion was sought on the means of conveyance (specifications, types of vehicles 
commonly utilized), standard procedures in carcass pick-up and transportation, and regulations 
regarding carcass conveyance.   
The most commonly used trailers in the industry with the standard rendering truck (semi-truck 
with an open box container) are 28, 32 and 40 feet.  Open containers are sealed with a tarp 
covering prior to transportations.  These come in a variety of mechanisms.  The majority of the 
industry in the Upper Midwest utilizes a roll-top system.  Transportation regulations mandate 
that the rendering vehicles are leak-proof.  In Minnesota, rendering vehicles are permitted and 
inspected.  The driver can retrieve carcasses from locations without ever stepping foot on the 
premises using an automated grapple system on the standard rendering truck.   Estimates on 
truck capacity for the maximum carcass weights of what each trailer can hold are below:
Trailer Length (ft) Trailer Weight Capacity lbs (kg) 
28'  40,000 lbs     (18,182 kg)    
32'    45,000 lbs     (20,455 kg)  
40'   50,000 lbs     (22,727 kg)
According to the industry experts, in a full carcass load (cattle), the carcass fluid (manure, urine, 
blood, basically any liquid that can spill out of the carcasses and into the truck during transport 
process) depth that one typically would see in the bed of the rendering truck is very little if the 
animals are loaded fresh (within 24 hours).  It was estimated that if one were to clean the bottom 
of the trailer with a broom and shovel you might get a 5 gallon pail full of carcass fluids, as there 
is very little leakage from fresh animals. 
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Appendix E: Expert Opinion – Depopulation 
Sources and Generation  
Expert opinion was sought for likely times for depopulation.  Although official regulations state 
euthanasia and disposal will occur within 24hrs or as soon as possible after premises 
classification (Red Book, National Center for Animal Health Emergency Management, 2011), 
we know that these will be dependent on resources and scale of outbreak as well as 
interpretation.  Experts in depopulation were contacted and requested to provide opinion on 
euthanasia time and depopulation rates.  
Experts who agreed to provide opinions for euthanasia and depopulations times were: 
 David Finch, Texas Animal Health Commission
 Lori Miller, Department of Homeland Security
 Donald Topliff, West Texas A&M University
 Jimmy Tickel, North Carolina Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services
 Darrel Styles, USDA APHIS
Euthanasia Time 
The following questions were provided to experts.  For each of these questions, experts were 
requested to provide their opinion on 1) minimum, 2) most likely, and 3) maximum timing.   
1. What is the most likely time to start of euthanasia for FMD Index premises?
2. What is the most likely time to start of euthanasia for Subsequent FMD premises?
3. What are the most likely depopulation rates (Expert Opinion) for cattle and hogs.
(animals /day or animals /hr)?
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Appendix F: Aerosol Science 
Sources and Generation  
Generation of bioaerosols can occur under natural conditions as well as from human activities 
such as spreading of slurries, pressurized spray irrigation, and aeration basins at wastewater 
treatment plants. In general, airborne microorganisms (bacteria, fungi, and viruses), and their 
components, are generated as a mixture of droplets or particles, having different aerodynamic 
diameters ranging from 0.5 to 100 µm ((Cox C, 1995); (Lighthart B, 1994)).   
Microorganisms associated with droplets evaporate to dryness or near-dryness before impacting 
the ground or vegetation and are transported by air currents (Dungan RS, 2010). The optimum 
aerodynamic particle range which represents a hazard to the human respiratory tract is between 
1.0 and 10 µm ((Mohr A, 2005); (Mohr A, 2007)).  
The dissemination and transport of bioaerosols depends on the method of bioaerosol generation 
and energy input into the system. Pressurized air, electricity, centrifugal forces, impaction, or 
heat can provide the energy needed to produce small particles. Many of these forces are so 
violent that inactivation of the microorganisms will occur. Fluids associated with newly 
aerosolized particles will instantaneously start to evaporate. The distribution and concentration of 
particle sizes are two important variables that directly affect the potential for dissemination and 
transport.  
Transport 
The transport, behavior, and deposition of bioaerosols are affected by their physical properties 
(i.e., size, shape, and density) and meteorological factors they encounter while airborne. 
Naturally occurring bioaerosols are ejected into the atmosphere by wind, rain and bursting 
bubbles, and other processes. The environmental conditions of wind velocity, RH, temperature, 
and precipitation significantly affect transport of bioaerosols with atmospheric stability being a 
major factor ((Jones AM, 2004); (Lighthart B, 2000)). 
Bioaerosols are subject to inactivation and transport the moment they become airborne. Particle 
sizes of droplets are usually small (2 to 10 µm) and they tend to follow the streamlines of the 
local wind. Particles with sizes smaller than 5.0 µm act as vapors and follow the streamlines of 
the airstream. The aerodynamic diameter of particles determines whether it is small enough to 
follow the streamlines of the surrounding flows, or if it is large enough to cross streamline flow 
and impact upon a surface. Deposition of larger aerosols occurs through gravitational settling, 
impaction, diffusion, convection (due to temperature variations), and wash-out by raindrops 
(Muilenberg M, 1995).  
Viability, Stability, and Infectivity 
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The viability of bioaerosols is dependent upon their chemical makeup and the environmental and 
meteorological factors they are exposed to, such as wind speed, temperature, and RH. These 
atmospheric conditions are strongly influenced by features such as large-scale flow fields, 
geographical locations, and local topography. The most significant environmental factors 
influencing viability are RH, solar irradiance, temperature, and oxygen concentration. Additional 
influences include air ions and open-air factors (OAF). Atmospheric turbulence is responsible for 
diffusion of particles during transport by the wind (mean wind speed) and is strongly influenced 
by local atmospheric conditions and the diurnal variation of solar irradiance reaching the ground.  
Of all of the measurable meteorological parameters, RH is the most important with respect to 
aerosol stability, which is an important determinant of bioaerosol viability and infectiousness 
((Mohr A, 2005); (Mohr A, 2007)).  The majority of airborne microorganisms are immediately 
inactivated upon release because of environmental stresses (desiccation, temperature, and 
oxygen) which act upon and alter the surface of the microorganism. The fundamental factors that 
affect the viability of microorganisms are the state of the water and water content of the 
bioaerosol. As RH decreases, the water available to the exterior environment of the 
microorganism also decreases. Loss of water can cause dehydration, resulting in inactivation of 
many microorganisms. The RH of the system also directly affects the density of the bioaerosol 
unit. The size, shape, and density of the aerosolized particles are directly related to the 
aerodynamic diameter, which determines settling velocity and location of deposition in the 
respiratory tract ((Mohr A, 2005); (Mohr A, 2007)).  
Studies to determine the effect of temperature on the fate of bioaerosols have generally shown 
that increasing temperatures tend to decrease the viability of airborne microorganisms (Dimmock 
NJ, 1967). It is difficult to separate the effects of temperature and RH, as the vapor pressure and 
RH of a system are dependent on temperature. The lipid content of the outer coat, or capsid of a 
virus, determines the stability at high or low RH values.  
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Appendix G: Expert Opinion – Aerosols 
Bioaerosol Experts Interviewed and Questions 
The three experts who responded to a request for expert opinion were interviewed about the 
probability of generating bioaerosols during pumping and transport of FMD-infected carcasses. 
Background information was provided to the experts on truck design, mitigations, and 
regulations.   The following experts that agreed to an interview have varying backgrounds in 
aerosol /bioaerosols research including engineering and aerosol physics.. 
 Robert DeOtte, PhD, PE, PG, Professor of Civil & Environmental Engineering, West
Texas A&M University
 Thomas Kuehn, MS, PhD , Professor, University of Minnesota, Department of
Mechanical Engineering
 Peter Raynor, MS, PhD, Associate Professor, University of Minnesota, Division of
Environmental Health Sciences
The questions below were posed to the experts in bioaerosol science. The table below 
summarizes their responses. 
Expert opinion was sought as to whether or not infected fluids that may leak from the carcasses 
post-mortem (infectious fluids like feces, urine, stomach/rumen contents, blood, milk etc.) would 
generate aerosols while being transported from site of euthanasia to disposal. The conveyance 
assessed were a box trailer that is 1) open on the top and 2) one that is covered with a tarp.  
Based on the likelihood definitions below, please provide expert opinion on aerosolization in 1) 
uncovered and 2) covered standard rendering vehicle during transportation 
Likelihood Descriptive Definition
High The event would be very likely to occur 
Moderate The event is unlikely but does occur with a certain probability 
Low The event would be unlikely to occur 
Negligible The likelihood that the event will occur is insignificant, not worth considering 
1. What is the likelihood (see chart) of significant aerosolization of carcasses fluids during
transportation?
2. What is the likelihood that a significant portion of the aerosolized particles to be less than
10 µm in size?
3. If aerosols could be produced from the carcass leakage, what is the likelihood they could
then move into the airstream at a subsequent farm?
4. Can you briefly describe your rationale for the selected likelihood levels?
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Summary 3 - Expert Opinion on Bioaerosols 
Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3 
UNCOVERED 
What is the likelihood of 
significant aerosolization of 
carcasses fluids during 
transportation? 
Moderate 
There could be two 
potential mechanisms 
for particle formation: 
(1) the sloshing of 
fluids back and forth 
against walls and 
surfaces which could 
form particles as the 
fluids impact, and (2) 
wind eddies forming 
drops along the 
surface of the 
fluids.  Although the 
carcasses will limit the 
sloshing of the fluids 
and the access of 
strong eddies against 
the surface of the 
fluids, thus reducing 
the risk of generation, 
I still think the 
likelihood is 
Moderate.   
Low 
The only aerosolization process considered is direct 
generation by the air stream when the trailer is in 
motion.  Generating aerosol particles from wet liquids or 
material that is moist is nearly impossible without 
extremely large shear forces caused by high air 
velocities. The liquid viscosity also plays a role, the 
more viscous the liquid the more shear force is required 
and the less likely that particles will be generated.  Dried 
material that was liquid at one time is also quite resistant 
to particle production.  Dry loose dust could be 
aerosolized in an open trailer but I think the materials 
you are working with should be very resistant to this.  
Another scenario is dripping from the trailer onto the 
roadway.  This potentially could generate aerosols 
directly at elevated speeds and perhaps the material 
deposited on a roadway could be aerosolized by passing 
vehicles.  I think the potential for this scenario to 
generate particles is higher than simply looking at the air 
forces generated in an open trailer because the fluid is 
being dripped in the form of small droplets into a fast 
moving air stream.   Nonetheless, I think the likelihood 
of this causing any secondary infection is quite remote 
Negligible 
Generating aerosols from 
the liquid collecting at the 
bottom of a trailer is 
unlikely.  The carcasses 
above that pool will hinder 
air flow and limit the shear 
necessary to generate 
droplets.  A more likely 
possibility for the 
uncovered trailer is matter 
on the hide of the upper 
layer or two of animals 
breaking loose by 
mechanical means and 
being carried by air 
currents away from the 
vehicle.  These solid 
particles could be fairly 
large but if so, will settle 
quickly.  The particles 
could impact solid 
surfaces and break into 
smaller particles.  The 
particles of concern would 
be dust from dried, 
crushed manure on the 
hide.  These can easily be 
smaller than 10 µm. 
What is the likelihood that a 
significant portion of the 
aerosolized particles to be less 
than 10 µm in size 
Moderate 
If some aerosol 
droplets are generated, 
a significant number 
could be smaller than 
10 micrometers 
because the water 
portion of droplets will 
evaporate, potentially 
causing larger droplets 
to rapidly become 
smaller.   
Low -
If aerosols could be produced 
from the carcass leakage, what 
is the likelihood they could 
then move into the airstream at 
a subsequent farm? 
High 
With the open top, I 
think there is a strong 
possibility for any 
aerosol droplets 
created to get into the 
air at a subsequent 
farm. Thus, I rate 1. c. 
High, although the 
overall likelihood of 
this outcome is only 
moderate because I 
think the risk of 
aerosols being 
produced in the first 
place is moderate.  
Moderate - 
COVERED 
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What is the likelihood  of 
significant aerosolization of 
carcasses fluids during 
transportation? 
Low  
Formation of droplets 
by wind eddies is 
negligible here, 
although droplet 
formation by sloshing 
fluid impacting on 
surfaces is still 
possible. Thus, I give 
2. a. the Low rating. 
Negligible  
Dripping could be an issue but direct aerosol production 
from under a covered load should be negligible 
Negligible 
If the trailer is covered, 
that further reduces air 
flow at the bottom of the 
trailer, the likelihood for 
any aerosol generation and 
release is negligible for the 
covered trailer. 
What is the likelihood that a 
significant portion of the 
aerosolized particles to be less 
than 10 µm in size 
Low 
Because the trailer is 
covered, humidity 
inside the trailer is 
likely to be higher 
than if the trailer is 
uncovered, meaning 
that aerosol droplets 
are less able to 
evaporate than in 1. 
b. Thus, I have rated 2. 
b. as Low. 
- -
If aerosols could be produced 
from the carcass leakage, what 
is the likelihood they could 
then move into the airstream at 
a subsequent farm? 
Moderate 
The trailer is not air 
tight, so there is still a 
significant possibility 
that any droplets 
formed will be able to 
escape the trailer at a 
subsequent 
farm.  However, it is 
certainly less likely 
than if the trailer was 
uncovered, so I rate 2. 
c. as Moderate as
opposed to the rating 
of High for 1. c. 
- - 
